Holding the Line at VMI and The Citadel: The Preservation of a State\u27s Right to Offer a Single-Gender Military Education by Jungreis, Jeremy N.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 3 Article 5
1996
Holding the Line at VMI and The Citadel: The
Preservation of a State's Right to Offer a Single-
Gender Military Education
Jeremy N. Jungreis
1@1.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeremy N. Jungreis, Holding the Line at VMI and The Citadel: The Preservation of a State's Right to Offer a Single-Gender Military
Education, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 795 (1996) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol23/iss3/5
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
HOLDING THE LINE AT VMI AND THE CITADEL:  
THE PRESERVATION OF A STATE'S RIGHT TO  
OFFER A SINGLE-GENDER MILITARY EDUCATION 
 
Jeremy N. Jungreis
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WINTER 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 3
 
Recommended citation: Jeremy N. Jungreis, Comment, Holding the Line at VMI and The 
Citadel: The Preservation of a State's Right to Offer a Single-Gender Military Education, 23 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 795 (1996).  
795
HOLDING THE LINE AT VMI AND THE CITADEL: THE
PRESERVATION OF A STATE’S RIGHT TO OFFER A
SINGLE-GENDER MILITARY EDUCATION
JEREMY N. JUNGREIS*
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 795
II. A GRAND TRADITION: SINGLE-GENDER MILITARY EDUCATION AT VMI
AND THE CITADEL ..................................................................... 798
A. Traditions of Excellence ....................................................... 798
B. The Adversative Methodology ................................................ 800
III. DOCTRINAL UNDERPINNINGS: GENDER AND EQUAL PROTECTION............ 802
A. The Basic Equal Protection Framework .................................... 802
B. The Genesis and Growth of “Intermediate Scrutiny” ..................... 804
C. Publicly Funded Single-Gender Education and the Equal Protection
Clause ............................................................................ 806
D. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan: “Intermediate
Scrutiny” Applied to Single-Gender Education ............................ 809
IV. THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY: THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
OF UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA AND FAULKNER V. JONES ........................ 811
A. United States v. Virginia (VMI I): The Liability Determination........ 811
B. Faulkner v. Jones (Faulkner I & II) ......................................... 814
C. VMI II: The Remedy Trial at the District Court........................... 817
V. VMI II: THE REMEDIAL DETERMINATION—SOME THINGS ARE WORTH
PRESERVING............................................................................. 818
A. Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL) ....................... 818
B. The Justice Department’s View: Integration as the Only Remedy ...... 820
C. The “Separate but Equal” Dilemma ......................................... 821
D. A Modified “Intermediate Scrutiny” Analysis—Convoluted but
Correct ........................................................................... 823
VI. A BITTERSWEET VICTORY FOR SHANNON FAULKNER ........................... 827
A. South Carolina Courts a Marriage of Convenience....................... 828
B. Hell Week: An Abrupt End to a Fleeting Victory .......................... 829
VII. REINFORCING FOR THE FINAL ASSAULT: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT ................................................................................... 831
VIII. THE FUTURE OF SINGLE-GENDER EDUCATION IN THE WAKE OF UNITED
STATES V. VIRGINIA ..................................................................... 832
IX. CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 835
I.   INTRODUCTION
It is easy to go too far with rigid rules in this area of claimed sex dis-
crimination, and to lose—indeed destroy—values that mean much to
                                                                                                         
* First Lieutenant, USMCR. The author would like to thank his fiancee, Jeanette Wat-
kins, for moral support and patience, and Lieutenant Colonel David Francis, USMC, for the
motivation to write this Comment. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author
and should not be construed as representing the views of the United States Marine Corps, nor
any other branch of the U.S. Armed Services.
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some people by forbidding the State to offer them a choice while not
depriving others of an alternative choice.1
Justice Harry A. Blackmun
Sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are
different as though they were exactly alike.2
Justice Potter Stewart
The men rise before sunrise. With the playing of reveille, they are out
of their bunks, on the move. All around is frantic activity, noise, making
of beds, adjusting of uniforms. No stalls divide the bathrooms; there is no
privacy. All is seen. People are yelling, “Formation in five minutes, get
out of the barracks.” Soon they are out in the cold morning air. They will
not sleep for nearly seventeen hours. This is not boot camp and these are
not soldiers. They are college students, cadets at the Virginia Military
Institute3 (VMI) and The Citadel,4 the state-funded military colleges of
Virginia and South Carolina.
There are currently no female cadets at VMI or The Citadel. However,
in 1990, an anonymous woman contacted the United States Department of
Justice (Justice Department) and filed a complaint regarding VMI’s sin-
gle-gender admissions policy.5 The Justice Department, acting under
statutory authority,6 brought suit against VMI on behalf of the complain-
ant; the suit alleged that VMI’s single-gender admissions policy violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7
Two years later, South Carolina resident Shannon Richey Faulkner,
who instructed her guidance counselor to delete any reference to gender
on her Citadel application,8 applied for and was granted conditional ad-
mission to The Citadel.9 The admission was withdrawn when The Citadel
learned that Faulkner was female.10 Shortly thereafter, Faulkner brought
                                                                                                         
1. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 734 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
2. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (Stewart, J., writing for the majority).
3. The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is located in Lexington, Virginia and is state-
funded. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d
890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993) [hereinafter VMI I].
4. The Citadel is located in Charleston, South Carolina and is funded by the state. See
Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993), mandamus denied, 14 F.3d 3 (4th Cir.), stay
vacated by 114 S. Ct. 872 (1994) [hereinafter Faulkner I].
5. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1408.
6. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1995), permits the
United States to bring actions on behalf of civil rights plaintiffs to remedy violations of the
Constitution or federal statutes. See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1408.
7. VMI I, 976 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
8. See Faulkner I, 10 F.3d at 229 n.1 (Faulkner wanted to be “considered on the merits.”).
9. Id. at 229.
10. Id.
1996]                    SINGLE-GENDER EDUCATION 797
suit against The Citadel seeking a court order that would permit her to
attend day classes.11
United States v. Virginia12 and Faulkner v. Jones13 raise the same fun-
damental questions. First, can the public funding of single-gender military
education promote and further an important governmental objective? Sec-
ond, can the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
permit a state to provide a publicly funded military education for one
gender, while providing no equivalent educational program for the other
gender? Third, if the Equal Protection Clause does prohibit a state from
offering single-gender education to one sex, while withholding it from the
other, can the constitutional violation be remedied through the establish-
ment of a parallel single-gender institution for the excluded sex?
United States v. Virginia has two litigation phases: the liability phase
(VMI I)14 and, on remand, the remedial phase (VMI II).15 A final disposi-
tion of VMI II was recently rendered by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit.16 Accordingly, United States v. Virginia be-
came procedurally ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court.17
Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court to United States v. Vir-
ginia on October 5, 1995.18 Additionally, the Court disposed of the proce-
durally incomplete Faulkner v. Jones.19 The Court’s resolution of VMI II
could potentially have broad ramifications.20 The fate of single-gender
                                                                                                         
11. Id. (Faulkner’s “motion did not request that she be admitted to the corps of cadets.”).
12. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
13. Faulkner I, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993), mandamus denied, 14 F.3d 3 (4th Cir.), stay
vacated by 114 S. Ct. 872 (1994) (upholding preliminary injunction granted by the District
Court for the District of South Carolina); Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994),
aff’d, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352
(1995) (trial and appeal on merits of equal protection claim) [hereinafter Faulkner II].
14. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1407.
15. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff’d, 44 F.3d 1229
(4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995) [hereinafter VMI II].
16. VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1229.
17. Interview with Steven G. Gey, Professor of Constitutional Law at the Florida State
University College of Law, in Tallahassee, Fla. (Feb. 15, 1995).
The Supreme Court considered granting certiorari to VMI I but did not do so because the
case was procedurally incomplete. Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion underscoring his be-
lief that the issues in VMI I deserved the attention of the Court. He stated, “Whether it is con-
stitutional for a state to have a men-only military school is an issue that should receive the at-
tention of this Court before, rather than after a national institution as venerable as the Virginia
Military Institute is compelled to transform itself.” VMI I, 113 S. Ct. at 243.
18. VMI II, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
19. Faulkner II, 116 S. Ct. 331 (1995) (dismissing certiorari); Faulkner II, 116 S. Ct.
352 (1995) (denying certiorari).
20. See generally Daniel Gardenswartz, Comment, Public Education: An Inner-City Cri-
sis! Single-Sex Schools: An Inner-City Answer?, 42 EMORY L.J. 591 (1993); Brian S. Yablon-
ski, Comment, Marching to the Beat of a Different Drummer: The Case of the Virginia Mili-
tary Institute, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1449 (1993); Douglas W. Kmiec, Rule of Single-Sex
Schools Aren’t Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1992, at A15.
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education, whether public or private, may ultimately hang in the bal-
ance.21
This Comment analyzes the present legal controversies surrounding
VMI and The Citadel. Part II chronicles the rich traditions of VMI and
The Citadel and endeavors to illustrate the positive role that the Cita-
del/VMI methodology plays in improving the lives of young men. Part III
discusses the doctrinal history leading up to the present litigation. In so
doing, Part III discusses how the Equal Protection Clause has been ap-
plied to gender classifications through the use of “intermediate scrutiny.”
Part III also assesses the line of cases construing the validity of single-
gender public education. Part IV delineates the procedural history of
United States v. Virginia22 and Faulkner v. Jones.23
Part V analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in VMI II and as-
sesses the court’s new test for determining the validity of publicly funded
single-gender institutions. Part V additionally argues that the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s approval of Virginia’s remedial plan in VMI II satisfies the Equal
Protection Clause. Part VI assesses the present status of the Faulkner liti-
gation and discusses Shannon Faulkner’s abrupt departure from The Cita-
del. Part VII discusses the possible outcome of the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing in United States v. Virginia. Finally, part VIII argues that valuable
educational opportunities may be permanently lost, to both genders, if the
Supreme Court does not affirm the Fourth Circuit’s final disposition of
United States v. Virginia.
II.   A GRAND TRADITION: SINGLE-GENDER MILITARY EDUCATION AT
VMI AND THE CITADEL
A.   Traditions of Excellence
VMI enjoys a prestigious history. It was established in 1839 in a
building previously used to house surplus ammunition and weapons from
the War of 1812.24 The fledgling university performed an instrumental
role in the War Between the States. Nearly one-third of the field grade
officers (majors and colonels) for Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of
Virginia were VMI graduates.25
                                                                                                         
21. See infra notes 327-48 and accompanying text.
22. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993); VMI II, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff’d, 44
F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
23. Faulkner I, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993), mandamus denied, 14 F.3d 3 (4th Cir.), stay
vacated by 114 S. Ct. 872 (1994); Faulkner II, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994), aff’d, 51
F.3d 440 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995).
24. HARRY F. BYRD, JR., THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE: IN PEACE A GLORIOUS
ASSET, IN WAR A TOWER OF STRENGTH 8-9 (1984).
25. Yablonski, supra note 20, at 1451.
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VMI’s alumni have continued to play important roles in every Ameri-
can military engagement since the Civil War. Names affiliated with the
Institute include VMI’s most famous professor, Thomas “Stonewall”
Jackson,26 and distinguished alumni General George S. Patton and General
of the Army George C. Marshall.27 Six VMI alumni have received the
Congressional Medal of Honor, the highest honor that can be bestowed
for military bravery.28
In 1842, the South Carolina Legislature created a military college at
“The Citadel.”29 The mission of the new college was to provide “a system
of education for the poor but deserving boys” of South Carolina.30 The
Citadel provided young “cadets” military training for “times of conflict”
and “knowledge in the practical arts and sciences for service as citizens in
time of peace.”31
“Times of conflict” were close at hand.32 The Citadel’s cadets played a
dramatic role in the War Between the States.33 They manned the cannons
that fired the first shots across Fort Sumter, marking the symbolic begin-
ning of the Civil War.34 During the war, the cadets were called upon to
defend Charleston and South Carolina eight different times.35 In one
noteworthy engagement, cadets helped delay General Sherman and his
battle-hardened Union troops for ten days while Savannah, Georgia was
successfully evacuated by Confederate forces.36 Over the years, The Cita-
del has produced many great leaders, both military and civilian.37
                                                                                                         
26. General Stonewall Jackson is one of the most beloved figures in Southern culture. He
bedeviled numerous Union generals by repeatedly routing the numerically superior Army of
the Potomac in the Shenandoah Valley. See ALLEN R. MILLETT & PETER MASLOWSKI, FOR
THE COMMON DEFENSE: A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 193-99
(1984). Every morning the cadets of VMI render a salute to the bronze statue of Stonewall
Jackson that stands in the center of the campus. See Yablonski, supra note 20, at 1451.
27. Yablonski, supra note 20, at 1451. General Marshall was the top general in the
United States Army during World War II and orchestrated the postwar rebuilding of Europe
pursuant to his “Marshall Plan.” Id. He won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. Id.
28. VMI I, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
29. THE CITADEL, AN OVERVIEW OF THE CITADEL: THE MILITARY COLLEGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA (1994) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF THE CITADEL]. Fearing an invasion by the Brit-
ish in the summer of 1780, the residents of Charleston, South Carolina constructed a large
rampart to protect the city. Id. Charleston residents named the rampart “The Citadel” because
of its imposing image. The city never fell to the British, and The Citadel remained standing.
Id.
30. THE GUIDON: 1994-1995 33 (Kirby R. Baker ed., 1994) [hereinafter THE GUIDON].
31. Id.
32. See id. at 34-35.
33. Id.
34. Id. The cannons were directed at a Union supply ship, the “Star of the West,” which
was en route to supply the Union outpost at Fort Sumter. Id. Under heavy fire, the vessel
turned about and put out to sea. Fort Sumter fell shortly thereafter. Id.
35. Id. at 35.
36. Id. The defense of Savannah was no small task. As one of the most successful Union
generals, General Sherman’s reputation for ruthlessness preceded him. He was responsible for
the burning of Atlanta and for cutting a swath of “scorched earth” across the heart of the Con-
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B.   The Adversative Methodology
At VMI and The Citadel, individual success stories are common-
place.38 Young men lacking direction and discipline, but with a desire to
improve themselves, come to the spartan barracks as an alternative to the
social distractions of the coeducational university.39 Others are drawn to
the rigor of the experience, which represents an ultimate challenge.40 De-
spite the iron discipline and scant social life imposed on cadets, the
graduation rate is significantly above the national average.41 This success
is in a large part attributable to the “holistic” educational methodology
employed at the two schools.42 Every activity, be it in the classroom or
barracks, is intended to instill knowledge and to modify behavior. At
VMI and The Citadel, character development is the primary goal.43 
VMI and The Citadel both use an adversative model of education.44
This model includes “[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of
treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoc-
trination in desirable values.”45 The model is premised on a theory that
                                                                                                         
federacy. See RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: A HISTORY OF U.S.
MILITARY STRATEGY AND POLICY 150-152 (1973).
37. See THE GUIDON, supra note 30, at 33-45.
38. Consider the story of Citadel Admission Officer Jeff Cole. Cole graduated with hon-
ors from The Citadel in the spring of 1994. He spent his first semesters of college at a coedu-
cational institution in South Carolina. He enjoyed the social aspects of the coeducational uni-
versity but felt that he was making insufficient academic progress. Lacking direction and per-
sonal discipline, Cole transferred to The Citadel in the hope of finding that direction. Cole
survived the grueling first-year cadet indoctrination and eventually graduated as an Honor Ca-
det from The Citadel. He credits The Citadel’s strict single-gender environment with helping
him to find personal direction and academic focus. Telephone Interview with Jeff Cole, Ad-
mission Officer, The Citadel (January 20, 1995) [hereinafter Cole Interview].
39. See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1426 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
40. Id.
41. See OVERVIEW OF THE CITADEL, supra note 29. At The Citadel, the overall gradua-
tion rate among cadets is 37% higher than the U.S. average. Id. Among African-American ca-
dets, the graduation rate is 135% higher than the national average. Id.
42. See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1412-15; Faulkner I, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993), man-
damus denied, 14 F.3d 3 (4th Cir.), stay vacated by 114 S. Ct. 872 (1994).
43. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1426.
44. Faulkner I, 10 F.3d at 229.
45. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993) (emphasis added).
Being punished or rewarded for the sins or accomplishments of brother rats, as well
as for one’s own, builds a sense of class solidarity in addition to individual respon-
sibility. The rat line is sufficiently rigorous and stressful that those who complete it
feel both a sense of accomplishment and a bonding to their fellow sufferers and for-
mer tormentors.
Id. at 1422.
At The Citadel, each cadet participates in the full rigors of barracks life—learning,
training and developing through drills, formations, parades, inspections, studies,
sports and even meals. Every cadet enters The Citadel on a basis of absolute equality
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adolescent males enter college with overinflated egos and misconceptions
about their own self-importance.46 The Citadel/VMI educational method-
ology challenges the entire belief structure of entering cadets and rebuilds
each young man into the mold of the citizen soldier.47 The tearing down
process can be ruthless, but it is applied equally to all cadets, regardless
of individual talents or abilities.48
The freshman year is the most severe time for cadets at both schools.49
It is designed to render an experience comparable to Marine Corps boot
camp.50 The first year also serves as a time of indoctrination and extensive
learning. Although there are small differences between the programs at
VMI and The Citadel, the experiences are comparable.51 An account of
the experience endured by first-year cadets at VMI illustrates the holistic
nature of The Citadel/VMI educational methodology.
The entering cadet is termed a “rat” because “the rat is ‘probably the
lowest animal on earth.’”52 “Rats” endure the “rat line,” a yearlong ritual
of harsh physical and psychological adversity intended to weed out the
unsuited.53 The “rats” are verbally abused, stripped of previous beliefs
and attitudes, and instilled with the core values of VMI.54 Survivors of the
first year become “brother rats.” Colonel N. Michael Bissell, the Com-
mandant of Cadets at VMI, describes the indoctrination and maturation of
the “rat” as follows:
                                                                                                         
with all others. Every cadet’s success is based on his own performance and achieve-
ment. The system is demanding; it is tough; and it is pervasive; but it is fair.
See also OVERVIEW OF THE CITADEL, supra note 29.
46. See VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
47. See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1421.
48. Id. at 1422.
49. Cadets gain rank and acquire greater privileges as they progress academically. Id. at
1422-23; THE GUIDON, supra note 30, at 171. However, every entering cadet, whether a
freshman or transfer sophomore, starts at the very bottom of the cadet social structure and
must work his way up through merit and self-achievement. Id.
50. VMI I, 976 F.2d 890, 893 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
51. See Faulkner II, 858 F. Supp. 552, 554 (D.S.C. 1994), aff’d, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995).
52. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1422 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993) (citation omitted). At The Citadel, the entering ca-
det is called a “knob.” See THE GUIDON, supra note 30, at 152-67.
53. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1422.
54. Id. at 1421 (“The VMI experience is predicated on the importance of creating doubt
about previous beliefs and experiences in order to create a mindset conducive to the values
VMI attempts to impart.”); THE GUIDON, supra note 30, at 167.
The Citadel is an institution of higher learning, to mold our minds, morals, and
bodies so that we may be fit officers and better civilians of our country. More than
that, however, it is a fortress of duty . . . a towering bulwark of rigid discipline,
instilling within us high ideals, honor, uprightness, loyalty, patriotism, obedience,
initiative, leadership, professional knowledge, and pride in achievement.
THE GUIDON, supra note 30, at 167 (emphasis added).
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I like to think VMI literally dissects the young student that comes in
there, kind of pulls him apart, and through the stress . . . teach[es] him
to know everything about himself. He truly knows how far he can go
with his anger . . . he knows just exactly what he can do when he is
physically exhausted, he fully understands himself and his limits and
capabilities. Something I think is the mainstay of leadership.55
Barracks life comprises a significant portion of the holistic education
received by cadets at VMI and The Citadel. All cadets are required to live
in the barracks during their four years of school.56 First-year cadets re-
ceive informal training and constant scrutiny by upperclassmen. There is
a total absence of privacy.57 Furnishings are sparse and inspections fre-
quent. “Rats” and “knobs” must maintain a full load of college classes, as
well as memorize and recite to upperclassmen on demand information
about institutional regulations, school history, and general military proto-
col.58
Punishments and rewards are collective as well as individual59 and are
designed to foster egalitarianism and class solidarity. Unlike the United
States military academies, VMI and The Citadel employ no ability-level
grouping.60 Each cadet comes to realize that he individually must perform
at required levels, lest his peers suffer for his personal shortcomings.61
III.   DOCTRINAL UNDERPINNINGS: GENDER AND EQUAL PROTECTION
A.   The Basic Equal Protection Framework
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment62 com-
mands that laws apply equally to all persons within legally cognizable
                                                                                                         
55. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1421-22.
56. Id. at 1423; Cole Interview, supra note 38.
57. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1424. This is particularly the case at VMI. The barracks at
VMI consist of a four-story, neo-gothic building that houses all 1,300 cadets. Id. The barracks
are stark and poorly ventilated—an atmosphere designed to induce stress. Id. Each class is as-
signed one floor, with the freshmen on the top (and most visible) floor. Id. A freshman cadet
on the top floor cannot go to the bathroom or take a shower without being observed by every-
one in that quadrangle on all levels. Id. Cadets are generally housed four to a room. Id. The
arrangement of the barracks places each cadet under the constant scrutiny of his peers and su-
periors and allows for minute regulation of behavior. Id.
58. Cole Interview, supra note 38.
59. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1422.
60. After admitting women in 1976, the Army Academy at West Point modified basic
training to break it into groups according to ability. Absolute equality of treatment was re-
placed with fairness. Id. at 1439.
61. Id.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). The Citadel and VMI, as publicly funded uni-
versities, are considered “state actors” and are accordingly subject to scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1938)
(holding that Missouri University curators were state actors).
1996]                    SINGLE-GENDER EDUCATION 803
classes.63 However, a government is not required to regulate different
classes of people identically under all circumstances.64 Thus, the Equal
Protection Clause accommodates the principle that some classes of people
are inherently different: “[f]undamental injustice would undoubtedly re-
sult if the law were to treat different people as though they were the
same.”65 Courts have found constitutional such disparate treatment from
laws regulating the age at which a person may drive or purchase alcohol66
and requiring only men to register for Selective Service.67
Generally, a government regulation may distinguish among classes of
persons if the regulation is “rationally related” to a legitimate public pur-
pose.68 However, certain types of regulatory classifications provoke closer
judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Courts consider in-
herently “suspect” governmental action that affects people differently on
the basis of race or national origin or that impinges on the “fundamental
rights” of individuals.69 Suspect classifications are subject to “strict scru-
tiny” by reviewing courts.70 In analyzing such governmental action, courts
employ a two-prong analysis:71 the governmental authority must demon-
strate a compelling state interest for the discriminatory classification,72
and it must demonstrate that the compelling state interest is advanced by
the least restrictive means possible.73 Courts almost universally invalidate
discriminatory governmental actions receiving “strict scrutiny.”74 This is,
at least in part, because little or no deference is given to the challenged
governmental regulation during “strict scrutiny” review.75
Regulations that discriminate on the basis of a person’s gender are not
“inherently suspect” so as to require strict scrutiny.76 Rather, gender-
                                                                                                         
63. See Faulkner I, 10 F.3d 226, 230 (4th Cir. 1993), mandamus denied, 14 F.3d 3 (4th
Cir.), stay vacated by 114 S. Ct. 872 (1994).
64. Id.
65. Id.; see also Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (“Sometimes the grossest
discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike.”).
66. Faulkner I, 10 F.3d at 230.
67. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding that a law requiring only men
to register for the draft did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
68. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). The “rational relationship” test is the
equal protection default position and is highly deferential to the governmental regulation in ques-
tion. Id. Classifications defined by economic factors generally fall under “rational relationship” re-
view. Id.
69. Faulkner I, 10 F.3d at 230-31.
70. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984);
see also Jon A. Soderberg, VMI Essays—The Virginia Military Institute and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause: A Factual and Legal Introduction, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 15, 21 n.25 (1993).
75. Soderberg, supra note 74, at 21.
76. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1980).
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based classifications receive a mid-level form of heightened judicial re-
view that is often described as “intermediate scrutiny.”77
Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Michael M. v. Superior Court of
Sonoma County78 expounds on the rationale for this distinction:
[D]etrimental racial classifications by government always violate the
Constitution, for the simple reason that, so far as the Constitution is
concerned, people of different races are always similarly situated . . . .
By contrast, while detrimental gender classifications by government
often violate the Constitution, they do not always do so, for the reason
that there are differences between males and females that the Constitu-
tion necessarily recognizes.79
The test for “intermediate scrutiny” is amorphous and often produces
inconsistent judicial results.80 The following section traces the develop-
ment of “intermediate scrutiny” for gender classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause.
B.   The Genesis and Growth of “Intermediate Scrutiny”
The United States Supreme Court first applied heightened scrutiny to
gender classifications in Reed v. Reed.81 Reed involved an Idaho probate
statute that preferred the appointment of men as probate administrators.82
Idaho attempted to justify the discriminatory statute on the grounds of
administrative convenience.83 The Supreme Court found Idaho’s adminis-
trative convenience rationale insufficient to justify the gender-based clas-
sification. The Court stated that Idaho’s statute was “the very kind of
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause.”84
Thereafter, the Court nominally invalidated the Idaho statute under a
“rational relationship” analysis, but language in Reed indicated that the
Court was applying a higher level of scrutiny.85
                                                                                                         
77. Faulkner I, 10 F.3d 226, 231 (4th Cir. 1993), mandamus denied, 14 F.3d 3 (4th
Cir.), stay vacated by 114 S. Ct. 872 (1994).
78. 450 U.S. at 478 (Stewart, J., concurring).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
phrases used [in “intermediate scrutiny” review] are so diaphanous and elastic as to invite
subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation masquer-
ading as judgments.”). See also Michael M., 450 U.S. at 468 (“As is evident from our opin-
ions, the Court has had some difficulty in agreeing upon the proper approach and analysis in
cases involving challenges to gender-based classification.”).
81. 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see also Yablonski, supra note 20, at 1455.
82. Reed, 404 U.S. at 73-74.
83. Id. at 76.
84. Id.
85. Id. The Reed Court found that increasing efficiency in probate matters “is not without
some legitimacy.” Id. Thus, under a true “rational basis” review, the Idaho statute probably
would have passed constitutional muster. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding dif-
ferent jury duty standards for women and men using a “rational relationship” test).
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The Court addressed several equal protection challenges to gender-
based discrimination in the years following Reed. Among the cases was
Frontiero v. Richardson.86 In Frontiero, the Court invalidated a federal
statute that provided greater benefits to female spouses than to male
spouses of military personnel.87 Justice Brennan, writing for the Frontiero
plurality, condemned the use by courts of “romantic paternalism” to
evaluate gender-based classifications and contended that “romantic pater-
nalism” had “the effect of invidiously relegating . . . females to inferior
legal status without regard to . . . actual capabilities.”88 Frontiero also
signaled to the lower courts that gender-based classifications could no
longer be justified by referencing invidious stereotypes about the roles of
men and women. Justice Brennan concluded that gender-based classifica-
tions were “inherently suspect.”89 However, later Supreme Court opinions
unequivocally reject the notion that gender-based classifications are inher-
ently suspect.90
Kahn v. Shevin91 and Schlesinger v. Ballard,92 decided shortly after
Frontiero, effectively narrowed the holding of Frontiero.93 In both Kahn
and Schlesinger, the Court upheld statutes that favored one gender over
the other. Kahn involved a Florida statute that gave widows, but not wid-
owers, a $500 cash exemption from state property taxes.94 In upholding
the Kahn statute, the Court found dispositive statistics that indicated that a
widowed woman working full-time would make significantly less than a
similarly situated male.95 Such an income discrepancy would exacerbate
economic hardship for a widow to a greater extent than for a widower.96
Thus the Court found that Florida’s unequal treatment of widowers had a
“fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”97
                                                                                                         
86. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
87. Id. at 680.
88. Id. at 686-87. The concurrence of Justice Bradley in Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall.
130 (1872), illustrates with great force the “romantic paternalism” that Justice Brennan found
objectionable:
Man is, or should be woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timid-
ity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life . . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to
fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Crea-
tor.
Id. at 684-85.
89. See id. at 688.
90. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1980) (“[W]e have not
held that gender-based classifications are inherently suspect.”).
91. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
92. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
93. Neither case applied “strict scrutiny” review, as suggested by the Frontiero plurality.
See id.; Kahn, 416 U.S. at 351.
94. Kahn, 416 U.S. at 352.
95. Id. at 354.
96. Id. at 355.
97. Id. (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
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The Schlesinger Court addressed a challenge to a federal statute that
granted female Naval officers a thirteen-year tenure of commissioned
service to reach a specified rank before mandatory discharge but gave
male officers only nine years to achieve the same rank.98 In upholding the
statute, the Court reasoned that because women were prohibited from
serving in combat billets, they had less opportunity to advance in rank.99
Together, Kahn and Schlesinger support the proposition that a classifica-
tion favoring one gender may be justified if it intentionally and directly
compensates the gender that has been disproportionately burdened by past
discrimination.100
Craig v. Boren101 set forth what has become the modern “intermediate
scrutiny” test for evaluating the constitutionality of gender-based classifi-
cations.102 Craig concerned an Oklahoma statute that permitted females to
purchase beer at eighteen years of age but prohibited the sale of beer to
males before they reached the age of twenty-one.103 The Craig Court ap-
plied a two-prong test that requires a governmental actor to show: first,
that a gender-based classification serves an “important governmental ob-
jective,” and, second, that the classification is “substantially related to
achievement of that objective.”104 Oklahoma offered traffic safety as its
justification for the disparate treatment105 and produced statistics backed
by substantial evidence showing that changing the statute would adversely
affect traffic safety.106 The Craig Court rejected these statistics and found
the Oklahoma statute unconstitutional because it failed to “advance sub-
stantially” Oklahoma’s “important objective.”107
C.   Publicly Funded Single-Gender Education and the Equal Protection
Clause
                                                                                                         
98. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 499-500 (1975).
99. Id. at 508-09.
100. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 n.6 (1976).
101. Id. at 190.
102. See Yablonski, supra note 20, at 1455.
103. Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92.
104. Id. at 197.
105. Id. at 200.
106. The Craig Court’s close scrutiny of Oklahoma’s traffic statistics was somewhat puz-
zling, given the substantial deference accorded the proffered statistics in Kahn and Schlesinger.
See Gardenswartz, supra note 20, at 619. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Craig, opined that
the majority’s statistical second-guessing of the Oklahoma Legislature was the “judicial
equivalent of a doctoral examination in statistics.” Craig, 429 U.S. at 224 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). Justice Rehnquist argued that “the legislature is not required to prove before a court
that its statistics are perfect.” Id.
107. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 211 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]his gender-based classifica-
tion does not bear a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”).
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The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion108 brought an end to legally sanctioned racial segregation in American
public schools. However, the Supreme Court has not extended the Brown
prohibition of “separate but equal” schools beyond the context of racial
classifications,109 and constitutional challenges to publicly funded single-sex
education in the years following Brown met with little success.110 Both state
and federal courts continued to apply a form of “separate but equal” analy-
sis to address gender classifications.111 In Allred v. Heaton,112 a Texas court
rejected a female plaintiff’s challenge to the all-male admission policy of
Texas A & M University. The Allred court found that women enjoyed sub-
stantially equal educational opportunities at other Texas state schools;113 it
reasoned that even if this were not so, under the Equal Protection Clause,
gender-based classifications required less scrutiny than race classifica-
tions.114
Beginning in the 1970s, courts intensified the scrutiny of publicly funded
single-gender education. In Kirstein v. Rectors & Visitors of the University
of Virginia,115 a Virginia federal district court held that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibited Virginia from denying women the opportunity to attend
the University of Virginia at Charlottesville.116 Kirstein was the first case to
acknowledge that the “prestige” of an institution is a relevant consideration
in determining whether a school’s single-gender admission policy passes
constitutional muster.117 While the Kirstein court found that no other Vir-
ginia university offered women prestige substantially equal to that of the
University of Virginia,118 it did not order the University of Virginia to be-
come coeducational. Instead, the court approved a consent decree governing
the phasing in of coeducation under a plan voluntarily formulated by the
University of Virginia.119
                                                                                                         
108. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the racially “separate but equal” public school
system in Topeka, Kansas was unconstitutional under “strict scrutiny” analysis).
109. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720 n.1 (1982).
110. See, e.g., Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86, 99 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Allred v.
Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251, 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
111. See Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), aff’d, 430 U.S. 703
(1977) (equally divided decision).
112. 336 S.W.2d at 251.
113. Id. at 258-59; see Gardenswartz, supra note 20, at 613-14.
114. Allred, 336 S.W.2d at 260.
115. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (three-judge panel approving Virginia’s plan to
allow females into the University of Virginia at Charlottesville).
116. Id. at 187.
117. Id. Educational “prestige” was one of the points of contention in VMI II. 44 F.3d 1229,
1240 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995). See infra notes 239, 244 and accompanying
text.
118. Kirstein, 309 F. Supp. at 187.
119. Id. at 188.
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Kirstein must be understood as a narrow opinion. The court refused to
hold publicly funded single-sex education per se unconstitutional.120
Rather, it expressly stated, with ironic foresight: “[W]e are urged to go
further and to hold that Virginia may not operate any educational institu-
tion separated according to the sexes. We decline to do so . . . . One of
Virginia’s educational institutions is military in character. Are women to
be admitted on an equal basis . . . ?”121
Federal courts have also upheld single-sex education. In Williams v.
McNair,122 a male plaintiff sought admission to South Carolina’s all-
female Winthrop College. The District Court for the District of South
Carolina evaluated Winthrop’s all-female admissions policy under a ra-
tional basis review and concluded that it was constitutional.123 The Wil-
liams court explicitly accepted that Winthrop College’s single-sex policy
was rationally justified by a need for statewide educational diversity.124
Specifically, the court stated: “[F]lexibility and diversity in educational
methods, when not tainted with racial overtones, often are both desirable
and beneficial; they should be encouraged, not condemned.”125 Although
it acknowledged that the Kirstein court disapproved a single-gender ad-
mission policy under similar circumstances,126 the Williams court distin-
guished Kirstein on the basis that Winthrop College did not enjoy the
prestige or offer the vast educational opportunities of the University of
Virginia.127 The court was unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that he
was inconvenienced by having to attend a university outside his home-
town.128
Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia,129 decided in 1976, is
the most recent case upholding publicly funded single-gender education.
In Vorchheimer, the Third Circuit borrowed the “substantial equality” ra-
tionale of Allred130 and the “educational diversity” reasoning of Wil-
                                                                                                         
120. Id. at 187.
121. Id.
122. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff’d per curiam, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
123. Id. at 137. Gender-based classifications were analyzed under a rational basis scrutiny
at the time Williams was decided. The Supreme Court had not issued its opinion in Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
124. Id. at 137-38.
125. Id. at 138.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. But see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
(convenience found to be a factor in determining whether male plaintiff suffered injury in be-
ing denied admission to all-female school).
In its subsequent review of Williams, the Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to issue
an opinion on the per se constitutionality of single-gender institutions. The Court avoided do-
ing so by summarily affirming the opinion of the district court. Williams v. McNair, 401 U.S.
951 (1971).
129. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff’d, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (equally divided decision).
130. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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liams,131 to hold that the Philadelphia school system could continue to op-
erate separate single-gender high schools for gifted students.132 The court
conceded that the programs for females did not provide the same science
curriculum and facilities as those for males.133 Nevertheless, the court
found the discrepancies insufficient to render the whole program unconsti-
tutional; it reasoned that differences between the sexes, under limited cir-
cumstances, could justify variations in educational curricula.134 The court
suggested that variations in parallel educational programs could be consti-
tutional if each school district on the whole gave both genders an equal
opportunity to succeed in the academic disciplines of their choice.135 It
then found that the Philadelphia school system, as a whole, provided
equal opportunities in science for boys and girls, but it reached this con-
clusion on little evidence. An equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the
Third Circuit’s holding in Vorchheimer without opinion.136
These early single-sex education cases represent judicial confirmation
that single-sex education may serve an important governmental purpose.137
However, the point at which single-gender education ceases to be an
“important governmental purpose” and, instead, becomes “invidious dis-
crimination” is unclear. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Mississippi Uni-
versity for Women v. Hogan138 addressed the issue but seemingly created
more questions than it answered.
D.   Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan: “Intermediate
Scrutiny” Applied to Single-Gender Education
The litigation in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan arose
when Joe Hogan, a state resident, sought permission to enroll for credit at
the nursing school of the Mississippi University for Women (MUW),
Mississippi’s only publicly funded single-gender institution.139 The Mis-
sissippi University for Women denied Hogan permission to enroll, not-
withstanding its policy that allowed him to audit the same classes for no
credit.140 Justice O’Connor, writing for a five-to-four majority, held the
MUW nursing school’s all-female admission policy unconstitutional.
                                                                                                         
131. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
132. Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 886-87.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 886.
135. Id. at 887.
136. 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
137. See generally Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir.
1976), aff’d, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (equally divided decision); Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp.
134 (D. S.C. 1970), aff’d per curiam, 401 U.S. 951 (1971); Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970); Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960).
138. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
139. Id. at 720-21.
140. Id. at 721.
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The Court found that MUW’s admissions policy failed the first prong
of the “intermediate scrutiny” analysis.141 For a state to maintain gender-
based classifications in education, it must demonstrate “an exceedingly
persuasive justification” for the classification.142 MUW proffered affirma-
tive action as its justification: namely, that the program provided women
with an opportunity to advance in a nursing career.143 The majority con-
ceded that, in some circumstances, providing affirmative action to a pre-
viously disadvantaged class could be considered an important governmen-
tal objective.144 However, the Court found that offering a nursing program
only to women would actually decrease the career opportunities and pres-
tige of women and thereby negate any affirmative action effect.145
MUW’s admissions policy also failed the second prong of intermediate
scrutiny.146 The policy of permitting male auditors to participate fully in
classes “fatally undermine[d] its claim that women . . . [were] adversely
affected by the presence of men.”147
One commentator has suggested that Hogan creates a third prong for
reviewing gender-based classifications.148 Language in J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel. T.B.,149 the Court’s most recent pronouncement on gender under
the Equal Protection Clause, supports such a proposition.150 The Hogan
Court, borrowing dicta from Frontiero, declared that “intermediate scru-
tiny” review must be applied “free of fixed notions concerning the roles
                                                                                                         
141. Id. at 729-30. The first prong, as articulated in Craig v. Boren, required the govern-
mental actor to proffer an “important governmental objective” for a gender-based classifica-
tion. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
142. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
143. Id. at 727. Justice Powell’s dissent suggested another justification for MUW’s single-sex
admissions policy: the promotion of educational diversity. Id. at 742-43 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The majority opinion never directly addressed the educational diversity issue. See id. at 731 n.17.
144. Id. at 728.
145. Id. at 729-30. Justice O’Connor reasoned that an all-female nursing program per-
petuates the stereotype of nursing as a strictly female profession; this stereotype leads to de-
creased wages and prestige for nurses. Id.
146. Id. at 730. The second prong of “intermediate scrutiny” required a governmental ac-
tor to demonstrate that a gender-based classification was “substantially related to the achieve-
ment” of the proffered important governmental objective. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
147. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730.
148. See Yablonski, supra note 20, at 1460.
149. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (holding gender-based peremptory challenges unconstitu-
tional).
150. See generally id. In VMI I & II and Faulkner II, the Fourth Circuit discussed Justice
O’Connor’s language in Hogan, not as a new “third prong,” but rather as an element of inter-
mediate scrutiny’s first prong. Specifically, a gender-based classification that stigmatizes one
gender vis-à-vis the other can never constitute an important governmental purpose. See Faulk-
ner II, 51 F.3d 440, 443 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 352 (1995); see also infra note 171. Gardenswartz, supra note 20, at 611 (assessing the
impact of Hogan on single-gender education: “[t]he more central question is now whether
separation on the basis of sex perpetuates common stereotypes about men and women”).
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and abilities of males and females.”151 Further, Hogan required courts to
engage in a “reasoned analysis rather than . . . mechanical application of
traditional . . . assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.”152
The holding in Hogan was narrow.153 Hogan did not decide whether
publicly funded, single-sex institutions were per se unconstitutional. The
Court expressly declined to address the issue because Mississippi main-
tained no other single-gender university or college.154 Hogan suggests that
publicly funded, single-gender education (whether in parallel institutions
or otherwise) can be constitutionally permissible, provided that an
“extremely persuasive justification” for gender-based classifications can
be shown.155 After an eight-year hiatus from the courts, challenges to the
constitutionality of single-gender education resurfaced in 1990. Litigation
initiated against VMI and The Citadel reopened the questions left unan-
swered in Hogan.
IV.   THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY: THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA AND FAULKNER V. JONES
A.   United States v. Virginia (VMI I): The Liability Determination
 The Justice Department began its quest to make VMI coeducational
on March 1, 1990, when it filed a complaint in the Federal District Court
for the Western District of Virginia.156 The complaint named as defen-
dants, among others, Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder, VMI, and the
VMI Board of Visitors.157 Additionally, the complaint alleged that VMI’s
failure to admit women into its “Corps of Cadets” constituted discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.158 The Justice Department argued that the only suitable
remedy for the constitutional violation was the admission of women into
VMI.159 Virginia, representing VMI, responded that the Equal Protection
Clause was not violated because the exclusion of women is imperative to
                                                                                                         
151. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-25.
152. Id. at 725.
153. Id. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s holding today is limited to the
context of a professional nursing school.”).
154. Id. at 720 n.1.
155. What constitutes an “extremely persuasive justification” in the context of single-
gender education, however, has remained hazy after Hogan.
156. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See VMI II, 852 F. Supp. 471, 473 n.2 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff’d, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th
Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
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preserving VMI’s unique and holistic educational methodology.160 The
Commonwealth further argued that VMI’s exclusion of women was re-
quired to promote educational diversity, an “important state educational
objective.”161 After extensive fact-finding, Judge Jackson Kiser found that
Virginia’s arguments justified the exclusion of women from VMI.162
The Justice Department appealed VMI I to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.163 The Fourth Circuit’s decision, however, left both sides unsure
whether they had won or lost.164 The court adopted the district court’s
finding that “single-gender education is pedagogically justifiable”165 and
agreed that “differences between a single-gender student population and a
coeducational one justify a state’s offering single-gender education.”166
Additionally, the court agreed that VMI’s unique method of education
would be materially altered by the integration of women.167 In summariz-
ing the “catch-22” of admitting women to VMI, the court stated,
“[W]omen are denied the opportunity when excluded from VMI and can-
not be given the opportunity by admitting them, because the change
caused by their admission would destroy the opportunity.”168
                                                                                                         
160. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1414. For a discussion of the holistic educational methodology
employed at VMI, see supra notes 38-61 and accompanying text.
161. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1415.
162. Id. The ease of VMI’s victory in the district court was surprising, considering the
conflicting interests among the named defendants. See Soderberg, supra note 74, at 18. Then
Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder was a black man who had personally been subjected to de
jure racial segregation in Virginia. Id. Ironically, in VMI I, Governor Wilder found himself
opposing the forces of gender integration. After Judge Kiser refused to dismiss Governor
Wilder as a defendant, Governor Wilder responded to the Justice Department’s complaint.
Governor Wilder stated that VMI’s policy of not admitting females was against his personal
philosophy but agreed that he would abide by the district court’s ruling. Id. Following the lead
of Governor Wilder, Virginia’s first female Attorney General, Mary Sue Terry, also withdrew
from representing the Commonwealth. Id. She cited a conflict of interest as the reason for her
withdrawal. Id. Attorney General Terry explained that in the absence of a contrary statutory
directive, Governor Wilder’s position was “persuasive.” Id. Accordingly, she felt compelled
as Attorney General to follow the Governor’s position. Private pro bono counsel was then ap-
pointed to represent the Commonwealth. Id.
163. VMI I, 976 F.2d at 890.
164. See Yablonski, supra note 20, at 1453 (“[A] three judge panel issued a convoluted
opinion that overturned the district court’s ruling but refused to compel VMI to admit
women.”). Conservative commentator George Will labeled the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
VMI I “a ruinous victory” for VMI. George F. Will, Government Coercion, VMI’s Diversity,
WASH. POST, January 31, 1993, at C7.
165. VMI I, 976 F.2d at 898.
166. Id. at 898 n.7.
167. Id. at 897.
168. Id. (emphasis added). The VMI “catch-22,” which the Fourth Circuit found so per-
suasive, echoes common sense. Even though a small minority of women would be physically
capable of performing all activities required of male cadets at VMI, a coeducational VMI
would be different from the all-male version. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1412-13. True, the dif-
ferences necessitated by coeducation would not destroy VMI’s ability to function as a military
school, but would the changes destroy the holistic educational methodology that makes VMI
unique? Yes, they would. For example, there is presently an absolute absence of privacy in the
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Despite its language suggesting an indication to do otherwise, the
Fourth Circuit refused to affirm the district court’s disposition of VMI I.169
Essentially, the court found that the women of Virginia were not afforded
educational opportunities analogous to those enjoyed by men at VMI.170
Therefore, the Commonwealth’s failure to offer females a comparable
single-gender military program violated the Equal Protection Clause.171
                                                                                                         
VMI barracks. The admission of women would force changes to afford both genders some de-
gree of individual privacy. Id. at 1438. The every move of each cadet would no longer be ob-
servable by every other fellow cadet in the barracks; this would limit the minute regulation of
behavior which characterizes the holistic VMI methodology. Cross-sexual relationships would
occur, facilitating distractions from already limited study time and creating the possibility of
dating rivalries, resulting in loss of esprit de corps among cadets. See generally ALEXANDER
ASTIN, FOUR CRITICAL YEARS (1977) (arguing that students at single-gender schools are able
to invest more energy in school-oriented activities because they have few opportunities to en-
gage in courtship activities). It is worth noting that many cadets come to VMI to escape the
social distractions associated with coeducation. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1426.
The current program at VMI requires every cadet to pass precisely the same physical tests
before graduation. The rigor of the tests would prevent a disproportionate percentage of
women from passing and, thus, graduating. Id. Accordingly, VMI would either need to estab-
lish different requirements for women and destroy the absolute equality of treatment that is
paramount to VMI’s methodology, or reduce the requirements so that they could be applied
equally to both sexes. Lowering the standards would destroy the rigor of the experience for
many male cadets, many of whom were drawn to VMI because of the extreme mental and
physical rigor. Id. at 1439.
Renowned Harvard sociologist Dr. David Riesman contends that because of the sociological
differences between men and women, VMI would eventually be forced to drop the adversative
system altogether. Id. at 1413. Because adolescent women generally enter college with less
self-esteem than men, the tearing down effect of an adversative education would be counter-
productive when applied to most women. See VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995). In order to draw a sufficient contingent of female cadets to
VMI, the VMI system would need to be modified to provide more emotional support for fe-
male cadets. Id. at 1413. The experience of the Army Academy at West Point when it became
coeducational supports Dr. Riesman’s contentions. Consider the following:
The prophetic tales of integration at West Point and the other service academies
demonstrate the inevitable demise of the adversative model at VMI. Since 1976, the
year West Point admitted its first female cadet, physical standards have been lowered
to accommodate the physiological differences between men and women. Basic train-
ing is now divided into groups according to ability . . . . Furthermore, studies show
that since integration at the academies, unit morale has declined as a result of cross-
sexual relationships and the distractions associated with them . . . . There have been
complaints of sexual harassment. Additionally, more than half of the women at the
academies believe that gender integration has been unsuccessful.
Yablonski, supra note 20, at 1471-72 (emphasis added). But see Bennett L. Saferstein, Note,
Revisiting Plessy at the Virginia Military Institute: Reconciling Single-Sex Education with
Equal Protection, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 637 (1993) (labeling the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning
“disingenuous” and comparing the VMI “catch-22” to the old Groucho Marx joke “I would
never wanna belong to any club that would have someone like me for a member”).
169. See VMI I, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
170. Id.
171. Id. The Fourth Circuit in VMI I never specifically delineated which prong of
“intermediate scrutiny” caused the constitutional violation. The argument has been made that
the constitutional violation in VMI I was the Commonwealth’s failure to satisfy the second
prong. See Soderberg, supra note 74, at 31 (“VMI’s all-male admissions policy did not pass
the second prong of the ‘intermediate scrutiny’ test because by not offering a similar opportu-
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The court proposed three ways that the Commonwealth might remedy
the constitutional violation: 1) become a private all-male institution and
reject state funding, 2) create an all-female military program parallel to
VMI, or 3) voluntarily integrate women.172 The Fourth Circuit then re-
manded the case to the district court to permit the Commonwealth to
“formulate, adopt and implement a plan that conforms to the principles of
equal protection.”173 
Following the court’s instructions, Virginia developed a plan to rem-
edy the constitutional violation. The evaluation of Virginia’s proposed
remedial plan, VMI II, was argued before the district court on April 29,
1994.174 During the one-and-one-half-year interim between VMI I and VMI
II, litigation raising similar legal issues as those presented in United
States v. Virginia was commenced against The Citadel in Faulkner v.
Jones.175
B.   Faulkner v. Jones (Faulkner I & II)
The obvious difference between Faulkner v. Jones and United States v.
Virginia was the presence of Shannon Faulkner, “a real, live plaintiff
who, but for her sex, would probably be a member of the Corps of Ca-
dets.”176 Shannon Faulkner, a seventeen-year-old high school senior from
Powdersville, South Carolina,177 applied to The Citadel and was tempo-
rarily accepted in January 1993. Upon discovering Faulkner’s gender,
The Citadel revoked her admission.178 Claiming a violation of her equal
protection rights, Faulkner promptly brought suit in the District Court for
the District of South Carolina.179 Faulkner sought a permanent injunction
                                                                                                         
nity for women, VMI’s single-gender admissions policy was not substantially related to an im-
portant governmental objective.”). However, the Fourth Circuit’s later analysis of the second
prong inquiry in VMI II indicates that the second prong was probably not the foundation for the
constitutional violation. See VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1237 (arguing that where single-gender educa-
tion is proffered as the “important governmental objective,” the second prong of “intermediate
scrutiny” is virtually bypassed because “the classification by gender is by definition necessary
for accomplishing the objective”). Thus, it is more probable that the constitutional violation in
VMI I was premised on the first prong of intermediate scrutiny. Specifically, the provision of a
VMI-type of education to men but not to women, without adequate explanation for the dispa-
rate opportunity, could not constitute an important governmental objective. See VMI I, 976
F.2d at 900.
172. VMI I, 976 F.2d at 900.
173. Id.
174. VMI II, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff’d, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
175. Faulkner I, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993), mandamus denied, 14 F.3d 3 (4th Cir.), stay
vacated by 114 S. Ct. 872 (1994); Faulkner II, 858 F. Supp 552 (D.S.C. 1994), aff’d, 51 F.3d
440 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995).
176. Faulkner II, 858 F. Supp. 552, 554 n.2 (D.S.C. 1994), aff’d, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995).
177. Id. at 555.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 554.
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compelling The Citadel to abolish its single-sex admissions policy and to
admit Faulkner and any other qualified female applicant into The Cita-
del’s Corps of Cadets.180 The Citadel stipulated that “but for” Shannon
Faulkner’s sex, she was qualified to be a member of The Citadel’s Corps
of Cadets.181
Four months after initiating the lawsuit, Faulkner filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction to compel The Citadel to admit her to day classes
pending the resolution of her case. The court granted the motion.182 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction over the vehement dis-
sent of Judge Hamilton.183 The majority balanced the potential harm to
The Citadel of admitting Faulkner against the harm to Faulkner of being
denied admission to day classes through the duration of potentially
lengthy litigation. The court concluded that “the district court did not
abuse its discretion in entering the preliminary injunction for [this] limited
but temporary relief.”184
The United States Supreme Court stayed the preliminary injunction in
Faulkner I on January 12, 1994, but vacated the stay six days later.185 Af-
ter one year of litigation, Shannon Faulkner began attending day classes at
The Citadel. She was the first woman ever to do this.186
In April 1994, Faulkner II finally proceeded to a trial on the merits.187
At trial, VMI I controlled all of the legal issues in Faulkner II except two,
“justification” and “remedy.”188 South Carolina, arguing on behalf of The
Citadel, contended that the constitutional violation in VMI I was grounded
on Virginia’s inability to “justify” providing a single-gender military edu-
cation to one gender while withholding it from the other. South Carolina
sought to avoid a similar result by demonstrating that providing single-
                                                                                                         
180. Brief for Appellants at 3, Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993) (No. 93-
2030).
181. Faulkner II, 858 F. Supp. at 555.
182. Faulkner v. Jones, No. 2:93-0488-2 (D.S.C. Aug. 17, 1993) (order granting prelimi-
nary injunction).
183. Faulkner I, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993), mandamus denied, 14 F.3d 3 (4th Cir.), stay
vacated by 114 S. Ct. 872 (1994).
184. Id. at 233.
185. Faulkner I, 114 S. Ct. 872 (1994).
186. Cole Interview, supra note 38.
187. Faulkner II, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994), aff’d, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995).
188. Id. at 555. Shannon Faulkner made a motion for summary judgment on May 28,
1993. Therefore, Faulkner II came to trial in the posture of a summary judgment request with
greater deference being given to the party opposing summary judgment. Because of the proce-
dural posture, Faulkner’s attorney’s accepted that the holdings in VMI I would apply with
equal force to The Citadel. Judge Houck made it clear, however, that Faulkner would be able
to challenge the applicability of VMI I to her facts at a later date if it became necessary for her
to do so. Id. at 555 n.5.
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gender military education to women was impracticable because of insuf-
ficient demand.189
South Carolina’s justification did not directly address single-gender
education in the context of the unique military experience provided at The
Citadel. Rather, the state argued that it could not provide any public sin-
gle-sex education to women because there was insufficient demand for
such an education among South Carolina’s female population.190 Further,
the state reasoned that any existing demand among South Carolina’s
women for single-gender education was “fully met by the private
women’s colleges, Converse and Columbia, whose South Carolina stu-
dents received state support through the South Carolina Tuition Grants
Program.”191 No mention was made, however, of providing for South
Carolina’s women who desired a “military education” in a single-gender
environment.192
The district court rejected South Carolina’s positions and found that
the state failed to articulate an “important policy” that justified “offering
the unique benefits of a Citadel type education to men and not to
women.”193 Accordingly, the court held that The Citadel’s all-male ad-
missions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.194
South Carolina fared no better on the issue of remedy. At the time of
the trial, the state provided “nothing before the court . . . that permits it
to determine what the defendants will do or can do to guarantee to the
plaintiff her constitutional rights.”195 Finding that South Carolina had not
proposed a sufficient remedy, the judge evaluated the three possible
remedies suggested by the Fourth Circuit in VMI I: privatization, integra-
                                                                                                         
189. Id. at 564.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 566.
193. Id. Judge Houck commented that South Carolina had “called the court’s attention to
no case that supports the proposition that lack of demand is a sufficient justification.” Id. at
564.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 567.
To place the matter of remedy in proper perspective, the manner in which [this] case
has been conducted should also be taken into consideration . . . . [T]he defendants
have continued to defend this case at a cost of millions of dollars to the taxpayers of
South Carolina when they do not have a single case to offer in support of their posi-
tion that a lack of demand for single-sex education on the part of women justifies
providing such an education only for men.
Id.
The South Carolina Legislature had formed a committee in May 1993, to make recommen-
dations regarding the provision of single-gender educational opportunities to women. Id. The
committee, however, met four times and was dissolved by operation of law. Id. South Caro-
lina’s lawyers did provide the judge with a document stating that “within sixty days after li-
ability is determined,” the state would set forth a specific proposed remedy, but Judge Houck
found the document unacceptable. Id.
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tion, or the creation of a parallel institution for the excluded sex.196 Judge
Houck reasoned that because Faulkner was about to enter her junior year
of college, time was of the essence.197 Since privatization of The Citadel
was not financially feasible,198 and the establishment of a program compa-
rable to The Citadel would take too long to give Shannon Faulkner an
adequate remedy,199 the district court concluded that Shannon Faulkner
must immediately be admitted into The Citadel’s Corps of Cadets.200
Further, the district court ordered that South Carolina be prepared by
August 1995, to implement a remedy, in accordance with VMI I, for other
South Carolina women desiring a single-gender military education.201 The
Fourth Circuit stayed the district court’s order pending appeal.202 The
court heard the appeal on January 30, 1995, four days after it released its
ruling in VMI II.203
C.   VMI II: The Remedy Trial at the District Court
Following VMI I, Virginia set out to formulate an appropriate remedy
for the constitutional violation noted by the Fourth Circuit in VMI I. Pur-
suant to the Fourth Circuit’s mandate, Virginia decided to create a paral-
lel leadership training program for women. The Commonwealth named
the new program The Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership
(VWIL).204
 In April 1994, Virginia submitted its remedial plan to the District Court
for the Western District of Virginia.205 After weighing the testimony of expert
witnesses for the Commonwealth and the Justice Department and making ex-
tensive findings of fact, the district court found that VWIL effectively reme-
                                                                                                         
196. Id. at 567-68 (citing VMI I, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2431 (1993)).
197. Transfer students are not allowed to enter The Citadel’s Corps of Cadets after the
beginning of their junior year. Cole Interview, supra note 38.
198. Telephone Interview with Major Rick Mill (USMC), Public Relations Officer, The
Citadel (Jan. 20, 1995) (“Privatization is not really an option; The Citadel would require an
endowment of between 350 to 400 million dollars to be able to privatize.”).
199. Judge Houck concluded that South Carolina’s previous actions indicated a strong
likelihood that the state might delay implementation of any parallel program for females to
such a time as to “insure that Faulkner would never have the opportunity to enroll in such a
parallel institution or program.” Faulkner II, 858 F. Supp. at 568.
200. Id. at 569.
201. Id.
202. Faulkner v. Jones, No. 94-1978 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1994) (order granting appellants’
motion to stay, pending appeal).
203. See Faulkner II, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995).
204. Answering and Opening Brief of Appellees/Cross Appellants at 11, United States v. Vir-
ginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-1667, 94-1712) [hereinafter Answering and Opening
Brief].
205. VMI II, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff’d, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
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died the constitutional violation in VMI I.206 Accordingly, the district court
held the remedy of VWIL constitutional and ordered its immediate implemen-
tation.207 The Justice Department appealed the district court’s remedial
determination to the Fourth Circuit.208
V.   VMI II: THE REMEDIAL DETERMINATION—SOME THINGS ARE
WORTH PRESERVING
[T]he proposed Plan is ingenious, and would seem to be unique. When
carried into effect, it will provide to women an educationally solid,
meaningful experience comparable . . . to the opportunities provided
for men at VMI, and one which is otherwise unavailable to women in
Virginia.209
Dr. David Riesman
Harvard University
A.   Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL)
VWIL is an all-female educational program established with state
funds at Mary Baldwin College (MBC), one of Virginia’s all-female pri-
vate schools.210 The Virginia Legislature passed a budget bill funding
VWIL “at the same level per Virginia student as the appropriation per
Virginia student at VMI.”211 In addition, the VMI Alumni Association
extended its career placement services to VWIL, offered assistance in re-
cruiting prospective students to VWIL, and began to develop a joint
alumni networking program with Mary Baldwin College.212 The VMI
Foundation pledged a $5.6 million permanent endowment for the benefit
of VWIL.213 The first VWIL class began in September 1995.214 Fifteen
students had committed to the VWIL program as of February 1995.215
VWIL planned to enroll twenty-five students in the fall of 1995, with a
slightly larger class expected in 1996.216
The faculty of MBC played a substantial role in designing VWIL.217
VWIL’s designers concluded that the mission and goals of VWIL could
                                                                                                         
206. Id. at 484.
207. Id. at 485.
208. VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
209. Answering and Opening Brief, supra note 204, at 12-13.
210. MBC had remained entirely female for more than 150 years and had a prestigious
history of its own. Answering and Opening Brief, supra note 204, at 11 n.3.
211. Id. at 14.
212. Id.
213. VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1234 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
214. Michael Janofsky, Yes, Ma’am, Mary Baldwin Offers Women Students a Military-
Training Program of Their Own, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1995, Womanews, at 10.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 11.
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be better achieved for young women if the VWIL program de-emphasized
the harsh adversative method incorporated in the “rat line” at VMI.218 In-
stead, the program designers sought to create “a structured environment
emphasizing leadership training.”219
Description of the essential program of VWIL follows. In addition to
the standard academic program offered at Mary Baldwin College, VWIL
students are required to complete, as a “minor,” a curriculum in leader-
ship training.220 Each student must take eight semesters of health and
physical education courses.221 The military aspect of VWIL includes four
years of mandatory ROTC training taught by ROTC professors from
VMI.222 In addition to standard ROTC training, students participate in or-
ganized military drill and the newly formed “Virginia Corps of Cadets,”
composed of the all-female VWIL, the all-male VMI, and the military
component of coeducational Virginia Tech.223 The Governor of Virginia is
the Commander-in-Chief of the Virginia Corps of Cadets.224 VWIL stu-
dents are required to attend a six-week ROTC summer training program
between their junior and senior years, and they will be eligible for mili-
tary commission in any of the four Armed Services upon graduation.225
VMI I suggested that the establishment of parallel single-sex military
programs could eliminate any constitutional violation inherent in provid-
ing military education only to men.226 In Faulkner I, the Fourth Circuit
provided further guidance, indicating that parallel programs would not
                                                                                                         
218. Id. at 18. The designers of VWIL considered that although a few women might desire
the harsh adversative environment of VMI, the overall demand for such an all-female program
would not be sufficient to support it. However, the designers felt they could produce the same
educational outcomes as VMI by using a similar, but less severe, educational methodology.
See VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995) (quoting,
with approval, educational specialist Dr. Heather Anne Wilson: “[T]he VMI model is based on
the premise that young men come with [an] inflated sense of self-efficacy that must be knocked
down and rebuilt . . . . What [women] need is a system that builds their sense of self-efficacy
through meeting challenges, developing self-discipline, meeting rigor and dealing with it, and
having successes.”).
219. VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1233.
220. Id. at 1234. To satisfy the leadership component, each VWIL student would be re-
quired to teach a leadership seminar or engage in a semester of independent research on a topic
relevant to women and leadership. On Saturdays, VWIL students would be required to attend
and participate in these seminars. Outside of the academic curriculum, students would be re-
quired to complete a leadership externship in the public or private sector and to organize and
carry out community service projects. VMI II, 852 F. Supp. 471, 494-96 (W.D. Va. 1994),
aff’d, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
221. VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1234.
222. VMI II, 852 F. Supp. at 494-95.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 497-98. Not all VMI students who desire commissions in the armed forces are
able to receive one. Various other factors, such as standardized test scores, are involved in
determining which cadets will receive commissions. The students at VWIL would have the
same eligibility and credentials to receive commissions as their male counterparts at VMI. Id.
226. VMI I, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
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have to be “identical for both men and women.”227 Rather, the court de-
termined that the nature of real differences between men and women
should dictate “the type of facility permissible for each gender”:
[A]ny analysis of the nature of a separate facility provided in response to a
justified purpose, must take into account the nature of the difference on
which the separation is based, the relevant benefits to and the needs of each
gender, [and] the demand (both in terms of quality and quantity) . . . .
[A]ny separate facilities provided for males and females may be based on
real differences between the sexes . . . so long as the distinctions are not
based on stereotyped or generalized perceptions of differences.228
In conformance with the Fourth Circuit’s guidance, VWIL represents
Virginia’s attempt to provide the young women of the Commonwealth a ho-
listic military education comparable to VMI’s program.229 VWIL’s institu-
tional mission is almost identical to that of VMI:230 “to produce citizen-
soldiers, who are educated and honorable women, prepared for the varied
work of civil life, qualified to serve in the armed forces, imbued with love of
learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership, and possessing
a high sense of public service.”231 The women of VWIL will pursue the same
five pedagogical goals as the men of VMI: “education, military training,
mental and physical discipline, character development, and leadership devel-
opment.”232 However, VWIL was not intended to provide a “mirror image”
of VMI. This, the Justice Department contends, was VWIL’s fatal shortcom-
ing.233
B.   The Justice Department’s View: Integration as the Only Remedy
The Justice Department opined that VWIL is inadequate, and it argued that
only one remedy would satisfy the constitutional violation found in VMI I: the
                                                                                                         
227. Faulkner I, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993), mandamus denied, 14 F.3d 3 (4th Cir.), stay
vacated by 114 S. Ct. 872 (1994).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. The VMI Mission Statement:
[I]t is the mission of the Virginia Military Institute to produce educated and honor-
able men, prepared for the varied work of civil life, imbued with love of learning,
confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense of pub-
lic service, advocates of the American Democracy . . . and ready as citizen-soldiers
to defend their country in time of national peril. To accomplish this result, the Vir-
ginia Military Institute shall provide to qualified young men undergraduate education
of highest quality . . . facilitated by the unique VMI system of military discipline.
VMI I, 976 F.2d at 893 (quoting THE VMI BOARD OF VISITORS, MISSION STUDY COMMITTEE
REPORT (1986)).
231. VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1233 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
232. Id.
233. See VMI II, 852 F. Supp. 471, 473 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff’d, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
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total integration of females into VMI’s Corps of Cadets.234 The Department
reasoned that if only one woman in all the Commonwealth, the “allegorical
Jackie Jones,”235 desired the harsh adversative experience of the VMI “rat
line,” the Commonwealth was obligated by the Equal Protection Clause to
provide it for her.236 Further, since major programmatic differences exist
between VWIL and VMI, VWIL could not satisfy the desires of the alle-
gorical Jackie Jones.237
C.   The “Separate but Equal” Dilemma
Before submitting VWIL to an “intermediate scrutiny” analysis, the
Fourth Circuit briefly discussed the notion of “separate but equal” schools
in the context of gender classifications.238 Cases such as Sweatt v.
Painter239 and Brown v. Board of Education240 direct that where no mean-
ingful and relevant differences exist between two classes of persons, equal
treatment is required by law.241 In the context of race, the law recognizes
no real differences among persons.242 In the context of gender classifica-
tions, however, real differences can justify different treatment under some
circumstances, provided that differences in treatment are sufficiently cor-
                                                                                                         
234. VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1235.
235. See Answering and Opening Brief, supra note 204 at 16 n.7. In this brief to the cir-
cuit court, the Justice Department discussed the origin of the “allegorical Jackie Jones” at the
district court remedy trial:
In its opening statement, the United States used the pseudonym Jackie Jones to iden-
tify a young woman who had made an inquiry about admission to VMI. In the course
of the proceedings, the Court, the parties, and the witnesses referred to the
“allegorical Jackie Jones.” The U.S. argued that if “Jackie Jones” desires to attend
VMI, the Commonwealth is constitutionally obligated to admit her.
Id.
236. Id. at 16.
237. VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1235.
238. Id. at 1237. Although technically outside the framework of “intermediate scrutiny,”
the issue of “separate but equal” in the context of gender will likely be of great importance
when VMI II is reviewed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Faulkner II, 51 F.3d 440, 450 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995) (Hall, J., con-
curring); VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1245 (Phillips, J., dissenting); Sara L. Mandelbaum, Women
Would Not Destroy The Citadel or VMI, VIRGINIA-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), June 7, 1994, at
A14.
239. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). The plaintiff in Sweatt sought admission to the all-white Uni-
versity of Texas Law School. Texas offered to create an African-American law school, which
it claimed would remedy any constitutional violation emanating from the University of Texas
Law School’s all-white admissions policy. The Supreme Court ruled that the Texas remedy
was inadequate because the intangible qualities that made the University of Texas Law School
prestigious would be denied African-Americans since they would be forced to attend a differ-
ent and less prestigious law school. Id.
240. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that schools segregated on the basis of race were inher-
ently unequal).
241. Modern courts have generally held that classifications based on race per se violate the
Constitution. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 478 (1980) (Stewart, J., con-
curring).
242. Id.
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related to documented differences between men and women.243 The Fourth
Circuit found the “separate but equal” analysis of Sweatt and Brown inap-
posite as applied to VMI and VWIL because relevant and meaningful dif-
ferences could and did exist between males and females in the context of
military education.244
This Comment suggests that the Fourth Circuit was correct in distin-
guishing Sweatt and Brown. Reality, and not stigma, dictates that men and
women are different from each other in many ways.245 In the context of
single-gender military education, an educational methodology that yields
positive results for one gender may prove ineffective when applied to the
other.
For example, studies from both sides of the ideological spectrum indi-
cate that most women learn and perform better in an environment where
they are able to build self-confidence through meeting challenges and re-
ceiving positive reinforcement from their professors.246 Unlike men, most
women do not enter college with over-inflated self-confidence and, thus,
                                                                                                         
243. VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995). The Su-
preme Court has held repeatedly that real differences between the genders may justify different
treatment under the law. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (requiring only
men to register for the draft); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1980) (holding
that California statutory rape law could constitutionally be applied only to males); Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding regulation granting women four years longer to
make specified rank before mandatory discharge); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)
(upholding law granting only women a specified tax exemption).
244. VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1237. If Virginia had attempted to create a “mirror image” VMI
for women, such a remedy would have endorsed “separate but equal” institutions segregated
on the basis of gender. Such a remedy would likely have failed constitutional muster under
Sweatt v. Painter because the 150-year-old Virginia Military Institute would have greater
overall prestige than the fledgling VWIL program. See id. at 1250 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
Because men and women are different, however, institutional prestige is not the only factor
to be considered in determining whether women are deprived of equal protection. Prestigious
or not, experts testified that the vast majority of women would not desire the harsh adversity and deg-
radation of the VMI “rat line.” See VMI II, 852 F. Supp. 471, 476, 480-81 (W.D. Va. 1994),
aff’d, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995). Nevertheless, the prestige
issue is significant. See generally Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Kirstein v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970). It will undoubtedly stand as a
significant obstacle to VMI’s success before the United States Supreme Court.
245. See generally Men, Women & the Sex Difference (ABC television broadcast, August
30, 1995).
246. See, e.g., Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy
League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1994) (arguing that the Socratic method
and adversative law school classes disadvantage female law students because women internal-
ize their problems as personal failure to a greater extent than do men).
The research of renowned Harvard sociologist David Riesman indicates that men tend to
learn better in an adversative and competitive environment in which the instructor is a worthy
competitor (as with the Socratic method employed in many law school classes), whereas
women “tend to thrive in a cooperative atmosphere in which the teacher is emotionally con-
nected with the students.” VMI I, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976
F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993). Of course, there are excep-
tions to the rule for both genders. But, an educational methodology must be designed to ac-
commodate the mean, and not the exception. Id. at 1413.
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do not need to be “knocked down and rebuilt.”247 If VMI is compelled to
accept women, it will need to modify its adversative educational methodology
to accommodate the distinctive psychological and sociological needs of
women, much as the Army Academy at West Point needed to do follow-
ing the integration of women in 1976.248 Colonel Patrick Toffler of West
Point249 testified during trial in VMI I that, based on his observations at
West Point, “the psychological and sociological differences between men
and women are real differences, not stereotypes.”250
Moreover, it is undisputed that there are real physical performance dif-
ferences between men and women. In VMI I, experts testified that the
majority of women could not perform the routine physical fitness re-
quirements mandated of all VMI cadets during the freshman “rat line”
and daily physical training.251 Further, if VMI is ordered to become co-
educational and female cadets are required to perform the same physical
regimen as male cadets, it is predicted that female cadets will suffer ap-
proximately 300% more injuries than male cadets.252 Real differences ex-
ist between genders and were properly accounted for in the design and
implementation of VWIL’s educational methodology.253
D.   A Modified “Intermediate Scrutiny” Analysis—Convoluted but
Correct
The Fourth Circuit began its “intermediate scrutiny” analysis of VWIL
by reiterating an important finding in VMI I: specifically, the provision of
a “single-gender college education may be considered a legitimate and
important aspect of a public system of higher education.”254 Single-sex
education, reasoned the court, had achieved widespread pedagogical ac-
ceptance and praise and could be considered an “important governmental
objective.”255
                                                                                                         
247. VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1234 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995)
(testimony of Dr. Heather Anne Wilson); see also VMI II, 852 F. Supp. at 476 (citing testi-
mony of Dr. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese: “Young women . . . do not need to have uppityness and
aggression beaten out of them”).
248. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1434.
249. At the time of the trial in VMI I, Colonel Toffler was the Director of the Office of
Institutional Research (OIR) at West Point. The purpose of OIR was “to assess the degree to
which [West Point] is successful in realizing its purpose, accomplishing its mission[, and]
achieving its outcome goals.” Id. at 1418.
250. Id. at 1434.
251. Id. at 1438.
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 245-52 and accompanying text.
254. VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
255. Id. See also Sandra Reeves, A Burst of Popularity: Most Women’s Colleges Are
Flourishing by Offering Students a Sense of Empowerment, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP.,
Sept. 26, 1994, at 105; Suzanne Fields, Assault on VMI Could Backfire on Feminists,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 8, 1992, at A12.
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The Justice Department once again raised “stigma” as a defense. It ar-
gued that, notwithstanding VWIL or the merits of single-gender educa-
tion, an all-male VMI could never constitute an important governmental
objective. In refusing to integrate women at VMI, the Justice Department
urged that the Commonwealth was “relying on false stereotypes and gen-
eralizations that women [were] not tough enough to succeed in VMI’s
rigorous, military style program.”256
In response, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that some women might
succeed in the strict adversative environment of VMI.257 However, no
matter how physically or mentally tough an individual woman might be,
her presence at VMI would fundamentally change the VMI experience and
thereby deprive her of the very military education she sought.258 The court
believed that continued maintenance of an all-male VMI will not perpetu-
ate archaic stereotypes. Rather, an all-male VMI, as one of two parallel
single-gender programs, will allow each gender to reap the benefits of a
single-gender military education. Since Virginia’s purpose for providing a
single-gender military education is not motivated by stigma and is “within .
. . the traditional governmental objective of providing citizens higher edu-
cation,” the Fourth Circuit held that VWIL satisfied the first prong of
“intermediate scrutiny.”259
The Fourth Circuit is correct in finding single-gender education to be
an “important governmental objective.” Single-gender education provides
an alternative to the mainstream in higher education; it facilitates educa-
tional diversity.260 The pressures of dating and inter-gender relationships
are significantly decreased at single-gender institutions.261 “Men can study
men, and women can examine women—more completely and undistract-
edly. And mature.”262 Studies show that students of both genders become
more academically involved and experience increased intellectual self-
esteem in a single-sex environment.263
                                                                                                         
256. VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1235.
257. Id. at 1240.
258. Id. See supra note 168 for an analysis of the VMI “catch-22."
259. VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1240.
260. See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1420 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993); Reeves, supra note 255, at 105.
261. See George H. Orvin, Same Gender Schools Important Step on Road to Maturity,
CHARLESTON POST & COURIER, July 22, 1994, at 19A. See also Astin, supra note 168.
262. Orvin, supra note 261.
263. See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1435; OVERVIEW OF THE CITADEL, supra note 29
(discussing the disproportionately high graduation rate at The Citadel in comparison to that at
coeducational institutions). Though the success of single-gender education at VMI and The
Citadel is readily observable, the success of single-gender education is particularly visible in
the context of single-gender women’s schools. Women who attend single-gender schools suc-
ceed in far greater proportions than their coeducational counterparts. See Reeves, supra note
255, at 106. For example, as of 1994, one-fourth of the women in Congress were alumni of
single-gender undergraduate institutions. Id. This was also true for one-third of the women on
the boards of directors of Fortune 500 Corporations. Id. Statistics show that graduates of
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 Virginia successfully demonstrated an “extremely persuasive justifica-
tion” for its gender-based classification.264 Men and women can, and
should, be trained to lead as “citizen soldiers,” but different methods of
leadership training produce better results in each gender, particularly in a
single-gender environment.265 The holistic VMI methodology, which can
be implemented only in a single-gender environment,266 has produced
leaders and men of good character for more than 150 years.267 It is worth
preserving.
The remedial demands made by the Justice Department before the
Fourth Circuit in VMI II reinforce the validity of the predicted VMI
“catch-22.”268 Under the Justice Department’s remedial plan, physical
modifications would be required at VMI’s barracks to afford female ca-
dets privacy in their living quarters.269 VMI would be required to make
changes to its “rat line” to lessen the likelihood of cross-sexual confron-
tations.270 Changes would be mandated in VMI’s athletic and physical fit-
ness programs, and VMI would be required to create an affirmative action
program to recruit female cadets, faculty, and administrators.271 In es-
sence, the Justice Department’s remedial plan demanded changes that
would destroy VMI’s holistic adversative methodology.272 The Common-
wealth’s refusal to admit women at VMI is therefore not premised on
                                                                                                         
women’s colleges are twice as likely to attain a Ph.D. or medical degree than women who at-
tend coeducational universities. Id. Alumni of women’s colleges go on to seek a graduate de-
gree 81% of the time. Id.
Congress has explicitly recognized the importance of publicly funded single-gender institu-
tions. The 1972 Title IX Education Amendments generally prohibited disbursement of federal
funds to educational programs that discriminated on the basis of gender. Id. However, Con-
gress intentionally excepted from the statutory prohibition single-gender schools, such as VMI
and The Citadel. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(5) (1994).
264. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan instructed that the first prong of “intermediate
scrutiny” requires a state to proffer “an extremely persuasive justification” for any gender-
based classification. 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
265. See VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1234 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995)
(testimony of Dr. Heather Anne Wilson); VMI I, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434 (W.D. Va. 1991),
vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993) (testimony of
Harvard Sociologist Dr. David Riesman); Janofsky, supra note 214, at 10.
266. See VMI I, 976 F.2d 890, 897 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993)
(“It is the homogeneity of gender in the process, regardless of which sex is considered, that
has been shown to be related to the essence of the education and training at VMI.”).
267. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
268. See Answering and Opening Brief, supra note 204, at 17 n.8.
269. Id.
270. Id. Since the vast majority of cadets at VMI and The Citadel would still be men and
the method of indoctrinating values would still be the inquisitional adversative method, it is
difficult to see how cross-sexual adversative confrontations could be avoided. A possible solu-
tion might be to separate women totally from men for purposes of the “rat line,” but, seem-
ingly, such a policy would contravene the very reason that women would seek admission to
VMI.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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“archaic stereotypes” or “fixed notions” of a woman’s place, but on re-
alities governing single-gender education in a military environment.273
The Fourth Circuit next evaluated the second prong of intermediate
scrutiny. Specifically, the court assessed whether the Commonwealth’s
“means” of promoting single-gender education, through VMI and VWIL,
“substantially advanced” the societal benefits of single-gender educa-
tion.274 The second prong presented a unique problem for the Fourth Cir-
cuit. Once an important governmental objective requiring homogeneity in
gender (i.e., single-gender education) was established, classification by
gender would be “by definition necessary” for “substantially advancing”
the objective.275 Hence, the second prong does not adequately test the
“fairness” of the VMI/VWIL dichotomy as applied to each gender. Con-
sequently, the Fourth Circuit held that where the legitimacy of a classifi-
cation is premised on homogeneity of gender, a third prong must be added
to the traditional “intermediate scrutiny” test.276
The Fourth Circuit formulated the third prong as “an inquiry into the
substantive comparability of the mutually exclusive programs provided to
men and women.”277 The court analyzed the educational benefits created
for men through the educational methodology of VMI and compared them
with the benefits that women would receive through the educational meth-
odology of VWIL.278 Where gender classifications are premised on real
differences between the sexes, parallel programs created to address those
real differences would pass constitutional muster if the benefits created
are “comparable in substance, but not in form and detail.”279
The stated educational goals of VMI and VWIL were identical and the
educational missions nearly so.280 Both institutions sought “to teach dis-
cipline and prepare students for leadership,” at identical levels of state
funding.281 Although programmatic differences would exist between VMI
and VWIL, comparable benefits would accrue equally to each gender
                                                                                                         
273. See VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1240-41 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1237. Parallel single-gender institutions, such as VMI and VWIL, “substantially
advance” the goals of providing the benefits of single-gender education and educational diversity.
If VMI is ordered to integrate women, publicly funded single-gender education would no longer
exist in Virginia. See Yablonski, supra note 20, at 1471 (“[I]ntegration at VMI would benefit
neither females nor males. Instead, Virginia with an integrated VMI would lose what it considers
to be an essential element of diversity in its system of higher education.”). Both genders would have
to attend private schools to reap the benefits of single-gender education. See Elizabeth Fox-Genovese,
Single-Sex Education Under Siege, WALL ST. J., August 24, 1995, at A16. Those who could not af-
ford the significantly higher costs of private school would no longer be able to obtain a single-gender
education. Id.
276. VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1237.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1237-38.
279. Id. at 1240.
280. Id. at 1240-41.
281. Id. at 1240-42.
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through the different methodologies of the two schools.282 Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit held that the parallel single-gender programs estab-
lished at VMI and VWIL satisfied the newly created third prong.283
The Fourth Circuit’s new third prong is a pragmatic approach to
achieving fairness for both genders. If men are given the opportunity to
reap the benefits of a single-gender military education, it is only fair that
women be given the opportunity as well. Nevertheless, differences between
the genders should allow different approaches to single-gender military pro-
grams, provided that each gender is afforded comparable benefits and nei-
ther gender is stigmatized by the classification.284 To insist that a state pro-
vide “benefits only when . . . provided in identical form to all of its citi-
zens, regardless of whether they are similarly circumstanced, is justified
only by a needless, and indeed baseless, demand for conformity.”285
Having analyzed VWIL according to its “modified intermediate scrutiny
test” and having concluded that VWIL remedied any previous constitutional
violation, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion and re-
manded the case to the district court with instructions to supervise strictly
the implementation of VWIL.286
VI.   A BITTERSWEET VICTORY FOR SHANNON FAULKNER
Four days after approving Virginia’s remedial plan in VMI II, the same
panel of the Fourth Circuit heard The Citadel’s appeal from the district
court’s ruling in Faulkner II.287 At trial in the district court, South Carolina
attempted to distinguish the constitutional violation noted by the Fourth Cir-
cuit in VMI I by arguing that insufficient demand among females for a sin-
gle-gender education in South Carolina justified providing The Citadel’s
education only to males.288 In response, the district court ruled, as a matter
                                                                                                         
282. Id. at 1241.
283. Id.
284. See Faulkner II, 51 F.3d at 443 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995) (“We noted, however, that when providing single-gender edu-
cation to one gender, Virginia could not, without adequate justification, deny a substantively
comparable benefit to the other gender.”).
285. VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1240.
286. Id. at 1242. The Fourth Circuit also found that the Commonwealth had remedied the
other matter that concerned the court in VMI I: the lack of uniform support for single-sex edu-
cation within Virginia’s governing body. Id. at 1241-42. By the time of trial in VMI II, former
Governor Wilder, Virginia’s new Governor George F. Allen, and the entire Virginia Legisla-
ture had officially come out in support of VWIL and an all-male VMI. VMI II, 852 F. Supp.
471, 483-84 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff’d, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281
(1995) (“[E]very person in Virginia officialdom who has or has had the authority to affect
Virginia’s policies on higher education has spoken in favor of diversity by offering single-sex
education to men and women of the Commonwealth and have strongly supported VWIL.”).
287. Faulkner II, 51 F.3d at 440.
288. Faulkner II, 858 F. Supp. 552, 564 (D.S.C. 1994), aff’d, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995). See supra notes 189-
94 and accompanying text.
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of law, that equal protection is a personal right and, thus, a lack of demand
alone could never justify the provision of publicly funded single-gender
education to only one gender.289
In a decision handed down on April 13, 1995, the Fourth Circuit disa-
greed that a lack of demand could never justify providing a benefit to only
one gender.290 However, the court effectively avoided further discussion
of the issue by affirming the district court on another ground.291 Specifi-
cally, the Fourth Circuit approved “the district court’s finding that the de-
fendants [had] failed to present [sufficient] evidence supporting an ab-
sence of demand.”292 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s determination that South Carolina violated Shannon Faulk-
ner’s equal protection rights in denying her access to a single-gender
military education.293
South Carolina once again fared poorly on the issue of remedy. The
Fourth Circuit found it “difficult to understand why in 1992 . . . South
Carolina did not consider VMI I to apply to it and, as Virginia did, begin
the process of selecting a course to correct the problem.”294 In conse-
quence, the Fourth Circuit ordered The Citadel to admit Shannon Faulk-
ner to its Corps of Cadets, unless the State could establish a parallel pro-
gram (comporting with VMI II) by August 1995.295 South Carolina was
given until fall 1996, to develop a parallel program for all other women
desiring a Citadel-type education.296
A.   South Carolina Courts a Marriage of Convenience
After two years of litigation, South Carolina was forced to face what it
should have realized long before: the constitutional violation found in
                                                                                                         
289. Id. at 564.
290. Faulkner II, 51 F.3d at 440.
291. Id. at 445-46. The Fourth Circuit sidestepped potentially troublesome legal issues when it
refused to affirm the district court’s holding on equal protection vis-à-vis demand. Had the Fourth
Circuit agreed with the district court that equal protection is strictly an individual right, for which de-
mand is irrelevant, a wide array of single-gender programs could arguably be found unconstitutional.
As George Will has argued, if demand is irrelevant to equal protection scrutiny, would not
an all-male college football team, or an all-male boot camp for juvenile offenders, be unconsti-
tutional in the absence of an all-female counterpart? Would the state be forced to create shel-
ters for battered husbands? See Will, supra note 164, at C7.
292. Faulkner II, 51 F.3d at 445-46. Since South Carolina failed to show sufficient facts to
support a conclusion of inadequate demand, the Fourth Circuit did not reach the issue of
whether inadequate demand could “justify” providing a single-gender military education to
men only. Id.
293. Id. at 450.
294. Id. at 448.
295. Id. at 449. If Faulkner was not admitted to The Citadel by the 1995-1996 school year,
her junior year, she would be ineligible to graduate from The Citadel because of the school’s
graduation requirements. Id. Thus, time was truly of the essence for her.
296. Twila Decker, Judge Sets Deadlines for Citadel, State Has 3 Months To Set Up
Parallel Program, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May 12, 1995, at B1.
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VMI I applied with equal force to The Citadel and required either the in-
tegration of women, the school’s privatization, or the establishment of a
parallel women’s program.297 Judge Houck instructed The Citadel that any
remedial program intended to include Shannon Faulkner would have to be
implemented and approved (following a full evidentiary trial) by August
12, 1995.298
South Carolina’s hastily created remedial program, introduced as The
South Carolina Institute of Leadership for Women (SCIL), was filed with
Judge Houck on June 5, 1995.299 SCIL was designed to mirror Virginia’s
remedial plan, VWIL, which had been upheld by the Fourth Circuit in
VMI II.300 After repeated warnings to Citadel attorneys that the submitted
plan was too vague,301 Judge Houck ruled that he would not try the case
until November 1995.302 The South Carolina Institute of Leadership would
not be implemented in time to prevent Faulkner’s admission to The Cita-
del. Shannon Faulkner had prevailed.303
B.   Hell Week: An Abrupt End to a Fleeting Victory
                                                                                                         
297. See Faulkner II, 51 F.3d at 448.
298. See Decker, supra note 296, at B1. South Carolina vowed to submit a specific reme-
dial plan for Faulkner and all other women by June 1995. Id.
South Carolina’s first task was to reach an agreement with one of the state’s two private schools
concerning the establishment of a program. Following an outright rejection by Columbia College,
the state was able to induce an initially ambivalent Converse College to cooperate in the formula-
tion of the parallel program at the Converse campus. See Second Chance To Explain Citadel Op-
tion Sought, S.C. Offering To Create Women’s Program, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 15,
1995, at B5. South Carolina would provide $10 million towards the establishment of the program,
$6.6 million would be raised privately by The Citadel, and $3.4 million would be allocated by the
South Carolina Legislature. Citadel Is Told Faulkner Must Also Be a “Knob,” Judge Rules She
Must Also Be in Barracks, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 8, 1995, at B3 [hereinafter Judge
Rules].
299. See Judge Rules, supra note 298, at B3; Alternative Plan for The Citadel Unveiled,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 6, 1995, at A10. For more specific details of the proposed SCIL
program, see Citadel Plan Keeps Female Cadets Out, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., June 6, 1995, at
B4.
300. Citadel Plan Keeps Female Cadets Out, supra note 299, at B4.
301. On June 24, 1995, Judge Houck lamented that he did not “have any earthly idea
what’s going to happen at Converse College.” Judge Wants Details on Citadel Plan,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 24, 1995, at B4. He instructed Citadel attorneys to provide
details on capital improvements at Converse, the names of the leadership faculty, and the
names of those who have applied for leadership program director. Id.
302. Debbi Wilgoren, Female Cadet Leaves Citadel, Faulkner Had Spent First Week of
Training in Infirmary, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1995, at A1. The Citadel appealed Judge
Houck’s ruling to the Fourth Circuit, which declined to stay the decision. Id. Subsequent stay
requests to Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia were summarily denied. Id.
303. The Fourth Circuit had instructed Judge Houck that Faulkner should be admitted to
The Citadel Corps of Cadets, barring the successful implementation of a remedial program by
August 1995. Faulkner II, 51 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995).
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Accompanied by her parents and four U.S. Marshals, Shannon Faulk-
ner reported to The Citadel on August 12, 1995, to take her place in The
Citadel Corps of Cadets.304 She was twenty pounds overweight.305 On
Monday, August 14, 1995, “knob hell week” began; the indoctrination of
the 1995-96 entering class was underway. Shannon Faulkner, however,
hardly participated in the experience she fought so hard to attain. Com-
plaining of heat illness, she was in the infirmary by mid-morning of the
first day.306 She remained in the infirmary complaining of stress-induced
stomach problems for four days.307 On August 17, The Citadel announced
that Faulkner had been medically cleared to rejoin her company the fol-
lowing morning.308 As the hours passed on August 18, Shannon Faulkner
did not emerge from the school infirmary. Rumors began circulating that
she was about to quit.309 Later that afternoon, Faulkner voluntarily re-
signed from The Citadel.310 Fighting to be heard over an approaching
thunderstorm, Faulkner tried to explain her reasons for leaving. She al-
leged that the stress had overcome her. Specifically, she said “The past 2 ½
years [of court battle] came crashing down on me in an instant . . . . I
don’t think there’s any dishonor in leaving. I think there’s dis-justice in
my staying and killing myself just for the political point.”311 The Citadel’s
first female cadet had left.
In the aftermath of Faulkner’s departure, feminists cheered Shannon
Faulkner for her bravery.312 Conservatives derided her for “political” mo-
tives.313 Lost on many, however, was the fact that Faulkner II was not over.
The Justice Department remained a plaintiff in the case,314 and South Caro-
lina was still under a court order to have a parallel program for women
(SCIL) established at Converse College by August 1996.315
                                                                                                         
304. See Wilgoren, supra note 302, at A1.
305. Suzanne Fields, Faulkner Displayed Grace Under Feminist Fire, Citadel Controversy
Should Spark a Fresh Debate About Single-Gender Schools, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 24,
1995, at A18.
306. See Wilgoren, supra note 302, at A1.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Wes Allison, Faulkner Quits; Other Cadets Rejoice but This Isn’t the End, Her Law-
yers Say, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 19, 1995, at A1.
312. See Sara Rimer, Shannon Faulkner Evokes Mixed Reaction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
1995.
313. See, e.g., Cal Thomas, Shannon Faulkner: Flawed Symbol, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 26, 1995, at B15 (“If Faulkner could not withstand the legal battle, how
could she have been expected to face a battlefield enemy? . . . There are no fainting couches in
war, and certainly not different rules of engagement for women . . . . This issue is about poli-
tics, not education or opportunity . . . . [P]olitics was her point.”).
314. See Faulkner Suit Options Debated: Women Joining It Seen as Having Little Effect,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 25, 1995, at B4.
315. Faulkner II, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995); see Decker, supra note 296, at B1.
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The Citadel’s holistic single-gender military program is still very much
in jeopardy. To succeed in keeping The Citadel all-male, South Carolina
must demonstrate that SCIL offers South Carolina’s female student popula-
tion “comparable benefits” to those The Citadel offers the state’s male
population.316
VII.   REINFORCING FOR THE FINAL ASSAULT: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
VMI II arrived at a very different Supreme Court than the Court that
heard Hogan fourteen years ago. Three Justices remain from the Hogan
Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and Justice O’Connor.
The Rehnquist Court is known for its commitment to judicial restraint and
majoritarianism317 and has frequently taken a narrow view of the Equal
Protection Clause.318 However, the Rehnquist Court has continued to exert
heightened scrutiny on gender classifications.319 Only eight Justices heard
VMI II. Justice Clarence Thomas, whose son attends VMI, has recused
himself from deciding the case.320
It is difficult to forecast how the Court will decide VMI II. The Court
often is unpredictable on equal protection issues. This unpredictability is
exacerbated by the inherent ambiguity of “intermediate scrutiny” review.321
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.322 is the Supreme Court’s most recent
pronouncement on gender under the Equal Protection Clause, and it may
provide guidance on how the Justices will vote on VMI II.323 J.E.B. held that
gender-based peremptory challenges were unconstitutional.324 In reaching
this decision, the Court reiterated the lesson of Hogan—specifically, that
gender classifications which “ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and
overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women” vio-
                                                                                                         
316. See VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1240 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995). The
successful implementation of SCIL is also contingent on VMI’s success before the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia.
317. EDWARD J. CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS 152 (1994).
318. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-21 (1989).
319. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1433 (1994) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“In over 20 cases beginning in 1971 . . . we have subjected government clas-
sifications based on sex to heightened scrutiny. Neither the State nor any Member of the Court
questions that principle here.”).
320. Paul M. Barrett, High Court To Hear Discrimination Case over VMI’S Policy of Ex-
cluding Women, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1995 at B5.
321. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
322. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
323. Interview with Steven G. Gey, Professor of Constitutional Law, Florida State Uni-
versity College of Law, in Tallahassee, Fla. (Feb. 15, 1995).
324. J.E.B. involved an action for child support in Alabama state court. 114 S. Ct. at
1421-22. An entirely female jury concluded that the defendant, J.E.B., was the putative father
of a child. Id. at 1422. The jury was all-female because gender-motivated peremptory chal-
lenges had been used to exclude men from the jury. Id.
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late the Equal Protection Clause.325 J.E.B. indicates that the Supreme
Court’s disposition of VMI II will likely hinge on whether the Supreme
Court believes that VMI and The Citadel, as male-only schools,
“perpetuate common stereotypes about men and women.”326
VIII.   THE FUTURE OF SINGLE-GENDER EDUCATION IN THE WAKE OF
UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA
Had VMI lost and the specious notion taken root that the law requires
men and women to be treated identically in every context, the next man
rejected at a private women’s college with a tax exemption or govern-
ment subsidy would have been the next constitutional claimant.327
If the Supreme Court reverses the Fourth Circuit’s disposition of
United States v. Virginia, holistic single-gender programs at schools such
as VMI, The Citadel, and VWIL will be destroyed.328 Both men and
women will be prohibited from enjoying the benefits of a publicly funded
single-gender military education. However, a decision ordering VMI and
The Citadel to become coeducational could have further-reaching effects.
Private women’s colleges may be forced to become either coeducational329
or to forego all state and federal funds.330 Moreover, successful single-
gender education programs in America’s inner cities may be forced to
return to a coeducational format as well.331
 If private women’s colleges are denominated “state actors” by the
courts, then they, like VMI and The Citadel, will be subject to
“intermediate scrutiny” review under the Equal Protection Clause.332
                                                                                                         
325. Id. at 1421.
326. Gardenswartz, supra note 20, at 611; see also, Lyle Denniston, Supreme Court To
Rule on Men-Only Admission at Military School; VMI’s Ban on Women at Issue in Equality
Test, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 6, 1995, at 4A.
327. Kmiec, supra note 20, at A15.
328. See Yablonski, supra note 20, at 1487-88.
329. See Fields, supra note 255, at A12; Reeves, supra note 255, at 107; Fox-Genovese,
supra note 275, at A16.
330. See Fields, supra note 255, at A12; Reeves, supra note 255, at 107; Fox-Genovese
supra note 275, at A16.
331. See Will, supra note 164, at C7; Gardenswartz, supra note 20.
332. Because they are generally not considered to be “state actors,” private organizations
are usually not subject to suit under the Equal Protection Clause. See Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)
(arguing that the Equal Protection Clause “erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory, or wrongful”). VMI and The Citadel, as publicly funded state uni-
versities, are state actors. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1938)
(holding that curators of the University of Missouri Law School were state actors for purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause). Less clear, however, is the status of private women’s colleges
and whether they would be denominated state actors if their single-gender admission policies
are challenged under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court has yet to distinguish a lodestar for determining when an entity that re-
ceives state or federal funds becomes a “state actor.” See Burton, 365 U.S. at 722 (“[T]o
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Thus, feminists face a dilemma in addressing United States v. Virginia
and Faulkner v. Jones.333 Some feminists adamantly support the rights of
women to attend single-gender schools but, at the same time, believe that
women should be able to attend college at all-male schools such as VMI
and The Citadel.334 If The Citadel and VMI are proscribed from retaining
single-gender admissions policies, then private women’s colleges, as
“state actors,” would logically be prevented from maintaining discrimina-
tory policies as well.335 Cynthia H. Tyson, President of Mary Baldwin
                                                                                                         
fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal
Protection Clause is an ‘impossible task’ which this Court has never attempted.”) (quoting
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)); see also Ronna G.
Schneider, State Action—Making Sense out of Chaos—An Historical Approach, 37 U. FLA. L.
REV. 737 (1985). Private women’s colleges across the country receive approximately 20% of
their operating funds from governmental entities. Yablonski, supra note 20, at 1483. In com-
parison, VMI receives approximately 40% of its operating budget from state funds. Charlotte
Grimes, Idea of Women as Cadets Has VMI up in Arms, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 18,
1990, at A1. The significant degree of public funding at private women’s colleges may lead to
their classification as “state actors” by the Supreme Court. See Grove City College v. Bell,
465 U.S. 555, 569-70 (1984) (holding that private college was subject to Title IX of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1972 because students at the college received federal financial aid);
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (holding that Mississippi’s practice of purchasing
and loaning textbooks to private schools that discriminated on the basis of race constituted state
action).
333. See Reeves, supra note 255, at 107; Fields, supra note 255, at A12.
334. See, e.g., William Rasberry, How Do You Justify Separate Schools?, WASH. POST,
May 25, 1990, at A21; Judy Mann, The Role of Women’s Schools, WASH. POST, May 16,
1990, at B3 (quoting Ellen J. Vargyas, Staff Attorney at the National Women’s Law Center)
(“I think [single-gender education is] a very important option for girls and young women to
have in ways I can’t see any legitimate need for (white) boys and young men to have . . . .
They have those role models. They dominate just about everywhere they are.”). But see
Fields, supra note 255, at A18 (“Few doubt that certain women can benefit from single-sex
schools. Why deprive men of equal opportunity.”).
335. Reeves, supra note 255, at 107; Fox-Genovese, supra note 275, at A16. Feminists
have attempted to distinguish VMI’s admissions policy from the admissions policies of single-
gender women’s colleges by arguing for a “compensatory” theory of equal protection jurispru-
dence. See Kmiec, supra note 20, at A15; Mann, supra note 334, at B3. Essentially, the
“compensatory” theory posits that one class of persons may be treated more favorably than a
different class of persons in order to “compensate” the benefitted class for past discrimination.
Feminists argue that single-gender admissions policies at women’s colleges “compensate”
women for past discrimination, while the single-gender admissions policies at schools such as
VMI and The Citadel stigmatize women. See Mann, supra note 334, at B3; Mandelbaum, su-
pra note 238, at A14.
There is significant legal support for the “compensatory” argument, particular in the opin-
ions of Justice O’Connor. See, e.g., J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476 (1989); Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982). Justice O’Connor commented in
Hogan that “[i]n limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be
justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately
burdened.” Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728. See also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508
(1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (supporting the proposition that compensation
for past discrimination can justify gender-based classifications that favor women). Accord
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 n.6 (1976).
But see Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 403-04 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that gen-
der-based affirmative action plans are subject to “strict scrutiny” when challenged under the
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College, aptly summarizes the nexus between single-gender institutions,
whether public or private: “This is the reality . . . . The fates of single-
sex colleges for both women and men are inextricably linked.”336 If VMI
and The Citadel fall, single-gender women’s colleges may face integration
as well.
Innovative single-gender programs in the inner city also may fall if the
Supreme Court reverses the Fourth Circuit’s disposition of United States
v. Virginia. Acting upon statistics regarding crime and school dropout
rates in the inner city and hoping to reduce crime and promote civic re-
sponsibility, school boards in some of America’s larger cities have im-
plemented single-gender education programs for young men and boys.337
In 1991, the Detroit School Board formulated a plan to create single-
gender schooling for boys and young men in the inner city.338 The pro-
posed single-gender institutions, dubbed “male academies,” were de-
signed to help foster a sense of identity and community in young boys
through the use of male teachers and a male mentor system.339 The male
academies never got underway. In Garrett v. Board of Education,340
plaintiffs with school-age daughters were able to obtain an order enjoining
the implementation of the male academies.341 Though recognizing that the
male academies’ purpose was an important one, the district court held that
the Detroit School Board was not permitted to “override the rights of fe-
males to equal opportunities.”342 The holistic educational methodology of
the Male Academies, in essence, could not be offered to only one gen-
der.343
The legal issues in Garrett, United States v. Virginia, and Faulkner v.
Jones were all quite similar. The constitutional violation in these cases
was premised on the fact that males were given the opportunity to benefit
from publicly funded single-gender education, while females were not.344
Moreover, like the Fourth Circuit in VMI I, the district court in Garrett
implied that separate academies for males and females may remedy the
                                                                                                         
Equal Protection Clause); Lamprecht v. F.C.C., 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that
compensatory FCC policy preferring female broadcast applicants over similarly situated male
applicants was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause).
336. Reeves, supra note 255, at 107.
337. See Gardenswartz, supra note 20, at 645.
338. Id. at 609-10.
339. Id. See also Dennis Kelly, Rites of Passage Encourage High Expectations, Providing
a Social Anchor, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 1992, at A6. The academies were intended to serve
approximately 250 boys ranging in grade levels from kindergarten through the eighth grade.
Gardenswartz, supra note 20, at 609-10.
340. 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1014.
343. Id.
344. See id.; VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229, 1232 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
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constitutional violation.345 Accordingly, if the Fourth Circuit’s remedial
decision in United States v. Virginia remains good law, inner city school
boards will be able to establish male academies to reach “at risk” males,
as long as comparable programs are established to reach and address the
needs of “at risk” females.346
New York, Baltimore, and Milwaukee have implemented, or are
planning to implement, holistic single-gender educational programs de-
signed to reach “at risk” inner city youth.347 If the Supreme Court affirms
the Fourth Circuit’s VMI II approval of VWIL and VMI as parallel single-
gender institutions, inner city school boards will be permitted to imple-
ment male academies and female academies.348 Innovative plans for com-
bating crime and poverty in the inner cities will be allowed to go forward,
and both genders will benefit accordingly.
IX.   CONCLUSION
The holistic education a cadet can receive at VMI and The Citadel is
unique in today’s society. This uniqueness comes from a carefully designed
curriculum that can flourish only in a single-gender environment. Boys can
learn to be men “more completely and undistractedly.”349
Nevertheless, as the Fourth Circuit recognized in United States v. Vir-
ginia and Faulkner v. Jones, pedagogically justified single-gender programs
cannot be operated in a manner that violates the Constitution. If a state
gives men the opportunity to benefit from a single-gender military educa-
tion, it is appropriate that women be given the opportunity to benefit from
such an education as well. Real differences between the genders, however,
can and should lead to different pedagogical approaches in the context of
single-gender military education.350 When a state designs two parallel single-
gender military education programs and implements the programs in a man-
ner designed to reach the same end result for both genders, it is difficult to
see how the Equal Protection Clause could require more.351 As Justice
Blackmun aptly stated in Hogan, “It is easy to go too far with rigid rules in
this area of claimed sex discrimination, and to lose—indeed destroy—values
                                                                                                         
345. See Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1013 n.14.; VMI I, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
346. See VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1239-40.
347. Gardenswartz, supra note 20, at 645.
348. See id. at 644.
349. Orvin, supra note 261.
350. Compare Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) with Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1980); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
351. See VMI II, 852 F. Supp. 471, 484 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff’d, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995) (“If VMI marches to the beat of a drum, then Mary
Baldwin marches to the melody of a fife and when the march is over, both will have arrived at
the same destination.”).
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that mean much to some people by forbidding the State to offer them a
choice while not depriving others of an alternative choice.”352
The Supreme Court should heed the words of Justice Blackmun and
affirm the Fourth Circuit’s disposition of VMI II. The single-gender tra-
ditions at VMI and The Citadel should be permitted to continue.353
                                                                                                         
352. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 734 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
353. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in United States v. Virginia on January 17,
1996. 64 U.S.L.W. 27d29 (U.S. January 23, 1996). See also Kathryn R. Urbonya, Separate
but Equal Revisited: The Court Weighs Whether State-Supported Military Schools May Bar
Women, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 44; Joan Biskupic, VMI Argues for All-Male Tradition,
WASH. POST, January 18, 1996, at A4. By most accounts, VMI did not fare well before the
Court. See, e.g., Biskupic, supra, at A4 (“[A] majority of the justices suggested the time may
have come for the prestigious state-run school to change.”). With Justice Clarence Thomas
having recused himself from the case, only eight Justices heard oral argument. Four of the
Justices, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, expressed strong skepticism about the exclu-
sion of women from VMI. Id. Of the remaining four Justices, only Justice Scalia was unwaver-
ing in his defense of VMI. Id. Nevertheless, the outcome of the case remains unclear. Justice
O’Connor, who is frequently the deciding vote on equal protection issues, hinted that a sepa-
rate program for men and women, within the grounds of VMI itself (and yielding a VMI de-
gree to both genders), might be sufficient to eliminate any constitutional inequity. Id. Ques-
tions posed by Justice Kennedy during oral arguments suggest that he might support such an
approach as well. Id.
Such a compromise approach would leave neither side happy but would likely yield an equi-
table result. VMI would presumably be able to maintain its adversative methodology, and
those women who desired it would have the opportunity to pursue the rigor and prestige of a
VMI degree.
